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Version	Accepted	for	Publication	in	Landmarks	on	Intellectual	Property,	Hart	Press,	Ed.	J	Bellido	R	v	Johnstone	(2003)	Elena	Cooper*	
Introduction	
For	intellectual	property	lawyers	today,	R	v	Johnstone1	is	a	rare	case:	it	is	the	only	House	 of	 Lords	 ruling	 on	 the	 criminal	 law	 provisions	 of	 a	 current	 intellectual	property	statute.	The	appeal	concerned	the	conviction	of	one	Robert	Alexander	Johnstone	at	Kingston	Crown	Court	for	12	counts	under	section	92	of	the	Trade	Marks	 Act	 1994,2 	relating	 to	 the	 possession	 of	 bootleg	 CDs	 (unauthorised	recordings	 of	 live	 performances	 by	 well-known	 popular	 music	 acts).	 In	 each	instance,	the	registered	trade	mark	was	the	name	of	the	music	artist	in	question,	eg	Bon	Jovi,	which	appeared	on	the	bootleg	CD.	 Johnstone	appealed	against	his	conviction;	he	had	pleaded	guilty	after	 the	Crown	Court	had	 ruled	 that	he	was	not	entitled	to	argue	his	defence	by	reference	to	the	limits	imposed	by	civil	law	on	infringing	uses	of	a	trade	mark.	Both	the	Court	of	Appeal	and	House	of	Lords	found	in	his	favour.	The	House	of	Lords	held	that	implicit	in	section	92	was	the	requirement	 that	 the	 defendant’s	 use	 was	 one	 to	 which	 the	 trade	 mark	proprietor	could	object	under	the	civil	law	of	trade	marks:	the	defendant’s	use	of	the	sign	must	be	use	‘as	a	trade	mark’.3	Today,	 Johnstone	 is	 usually	 remembered	 by	 intellectual	 property	 lawyers	 for	what	the	Lords	had	to	say	about	the	meaning	of	‘use	as	a	trade	mark’	and	this	has	been	much	discussed	in	existing	scholarship.4	As	Lord	Nicholls	opined:		
                                                
*	With	thanks	to	Lindsay	Farmer,	James	Chalmers	and	Fiona	Leverick	for	their	comments	on	an	earlier	draft	of	this	paper	presented	at	the	Criminal	Law	Forum,	University	of	Glasgow,	June	2016.	1	R	v	Johnstone	[2003]	UKHL	28,	[2003]	1	WLR	1736,	[2002]	EWCA	Crim	194,	[2003]	FSR	56.	2	The	details	of	s	92	are	at	the	text	following	n	25.	3	ibid	(HL),	[28]	and	[31],	Lord	Nicholls.	4	See,	 for	example,	NM	Dawson,	 ‘Non-Trade	Mark	Use’,	 (2012)	4	 Intellectual	Property	Quarterly	204–26;	B	Trimmer,	‘The	Power	of	Attraction:	Do	Trade	Marks	have	an	“Image”	Problem	in	the	English	Courts’,	(2009)	
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the	essence	of	a	trade	mark	has	always	been	that	it	is	a	badge	of	origin.	It	indicates	trade	source:	a	connection	in	the	course	of	trade	between	the	goods	and	the	proprietor	of	the	mark.5			 On	 this	 issue,	 Johnstone	 is	 a	 dated	 landmark;	 the	 legal	 landscape	 has	changed	 significantly	 since	 Johnstone	 was	 decided	 in	 2003.	 Two	 points	 can	 be	noted.	First,	developments	in	the	European	Court	of	Justice’s	case	law	mean	that	it	is	now	clear	that	a	broad	range	of	other	trade	mark	functions	are	now	relevant	under	 the	civil	 law	of	 trade	marks:	 ‘in	particular	…	guaranteeing	 the	quality	of	the	 goods	 or	 services	 in	 question	 and	 those	 of	 communication,	 investment	 or	advertising’.6	The	expansion	in	trade	mark	functions	in	the	civil	law	has	resulted	in	increased	importance	for	defences	to	infringement	(section	11)	in	limiting	the	scope	 of	 protection.	Accordingly,	 were	 the	 test	 in	 Johnstone	 to	 be	 adapted	 to	accommodate	 these	 other	 trade	 mark	 functions,	 no	 longer	 would	 it	 set	significant	limits	on	section	92;	the	‘scope	or	“footprint”	of	section	92’	would	not	be	necessarily	 ‘smaller	 than	and	wholly	 contained	within,	 the	 ‘footprint’	 of	 the	civil	infringement	sections’,	as	the	Lords	had	intended.	7			 Secondly,	as	House	of	Lords’	judgments	acknowledged,8	the	issue	of	trade	mark	use	would	not	have	arisen	had	the	case	in	Johnstone	instead	been	brought	in	respect	of	criminal	offences	relating	to	copyright	(eg	in	the	music	and	lyrics)	and/or	performers	rights	(in	respect	of	an	‘illicit	recording’)	under	sections	107	and	197	Copyright	Designs	and	Patents	Act	1988.9	The	prosecution	in	Johnstone	brought	 the	 case	 under	 the	 Trade	 Marks	 Act	 1994	 because	 of	 the	 far	 higher	penalties	available	at	that	time	for	trade	mark	offences	(a	maximum	of	ten	years’	
                                                                                                                                      
European	 Intellectual	 Property	 Review	 195–201;	 P	 Yap,	 ‘Making	 Sense	 of	 Trade	 Mark	 Use’,	 (2007)	 29	
European	Intellectual	Property	Review	10,	420–27.	C	Rutz,	 ‘After	Arsenal	and	Electrocoin:	Can	the	Opinions	on	Trade	Mark	Use	be	Reconciled?’,	(2005)	36	International	Review	of	Intellectual	Property	and	Competition	
Law	6,	682–705;	H	Norman,	‘Time	to	Blow	the	Whistle	on	Trade	Mark	Use?’,	(2004)	1	Intellectual	Property	
Quarterly	1–34.	5	R	v	Johnstone,	HL	[13].	6	C-487/07	L’Oreal	v	Bellure	[2009]	ECR	I-5185	(ECJ,	First	Chamber),	[58].	See	also,	C-236/08-238/08	Louis	
Vuitton	v	Google	France	[2010]	ECR	I-2417	(ECJ,	Grand	Chamber),	[77];	C-558/08	Portakabin	v	Primakabin	[2010]	ECR	I-6963	(ECJ,	First	Chamber),	[30].	7	R	v	Johnstone,	HL,	[73]	per	Lord	Walker.		8	ibid,	HL	[40]	per	Lord	Nicholls	and	[86]	per	Lord	Walker.	9	1988.	
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imprisonment	 and/or	 a	 fine10)	 as	 compared	 to	 criminal	 offences	 relating	 to	performers’	 rights	 or	 copyright	 (then,	 a	maximum	 of	 two	 years	 imprisonment	and/or	 a	 fine11).	 However,	 this	 inconsistency	 has	 since	 been	 removed:	 the	maximum	penalty	of	ten	years	and/or	an	unlimited	fine	is	now	also	applicable	to	copyright	 and	 performers’	 rights12	(though	 the	 discrepancy	 remains	 for	 online	infringement).13			 As	well	as	the	question	of	trade	mark	use,	the	ruling	in	 Johnstone	 is	also	well	known	for	the	human	rights	issues	that	it	raised:	its	contribution	to	case	law	on	 the	 nature	 of	 burden	 of	 proof	 to	 be	 borne	 by	 the	 defendant	 in	 running	 a	statutory	defence	(in	 Johnstone,	section	92(5)	Trade	Marks	Act	1994,	discussed	later)	and	its	compatibility	with	the	presumption	of	innocence	under	Art	6(2)	of	the	 European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 Rights.	 In	 Johnstone,	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	preferred	the	approach	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	R	v	S,14	over	that	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	 in	 Johnstone;	 section	92(5)	 imposed	a	 legal	 burden	on	 the	 accused	and	this	was	compatible	with	the	presumption	of	innocence	in	Article	6(2)	European	Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights.15	This	 aspect	 of	 Johnstone	has	 also	 been	 closely	considered	in	the	existing	literature.16		
                                                
10	Trade	Marks	Act	1999,	s	92(6).	11	Copyright	Designs	and	Patents	Act	1988,	ss	107(4)(b)	and	198(5)(b)	as	enacted.	12	Copyright	Designs	and	Patents	Act	1888,	ss	107(4)(b)	and	198(4)(b)	introduced	by	the	Copyright	etc	and	Trade	 Marks	 (Offences	 and	 Enforcement)	 Act	 2002,	 s	 1.	 The	 same	 maximum	 penalties	 are	 also	 now	applicable	to	registered	design	infringement:	Intellectual	Property	Act	2014,	s	13,	introducing	a	new	s	35ZA	Registered	Designs	Act	1949.	13	Copyright	 Designs	 and	 Patents	 Act	 1988,	 ss	 107(4A)(b)	 and	 198(4A)(b):	 where	 the	 offences	 are	committed	by	communicating	a	work	to	the	public,	the	maximum	penalty	remains	two	years’	imprisonment	or	a	fine.	The	Gowers	Review	on	Intellectual	Property	(2006)	recommended	the	removal	of	this	inconsistency	as	regards	copyright	 law	(Recommendation	36,	para	5.81)	and	it	 is	the	current	Government’s	 intention	to	introduce	 legislation	 on	 this	 point	 (Criminal	 Sanctions	 for	 Online	 Copyright	 Infringement:	 Government	
Consultation	Response,	IPO,	2016).	14	R	v	S	[2002]	EWCA	Crim	2558,	1	Cr	App	R	35.	15	R	v	Johnstone,	HL,	[54].	This	aspect	of	the	case	is	referred	to	at	(text	to	n	64	below).	16	See,	 for	 example:	 NP	Metcalfe	 and	 AJ	 Ashworth	 ‘Case	 Comment:	 Trade	Mark:	 Trade	Marks	 At	 1994	 ss	11(2),	92	–	infringement’	(2004)	Criminal	Law	Review	245–47;	V	Tadros	and	S	Tierney,	‘The	presumption	of	innocence	 and	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Act’	 (2004)	 67	Modern	 Law	Review	 3,	 402–34;	 B	 Fitzpatrick,	 ‘Reverse	burden	and	Article	6(2)	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights’	(2005)	69	Journal	of	Criminal	Law	6,	478–84;	 I	 Dennis,	 ‘Reverse	 Onuses	 and	 the	 Presumption	 of	 Innocence:	 In	 Search	 of	 Principle’	 (2005)	
Criminal	Law	Review	901–36.		
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	 This	chapter	leaves	these	more	frequently	discussed	aspects	of	Johnstone	to	 one	 side.	 Instead,	 I	 consider	 Johnstone	 as	 a	 landmark	 in	 an	 area	 that	 has	 to	date	received	little	consideration:	the	relation	between	civil	and	criminal	law	in	intellectual	property.	Intellectual	property	offences,	I	argue,	are	caught	between	their	 characterisation,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 as	 offences	 of	 ‘dishonesty’	 and	 on	 the	other,	 ‘quasi-criminal’	 regulatory	 crime.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 public	 interest	dimension	 to	 countering	piracy	and	counterfeiting,	which	 justifies	 a	 regulatory	characterisation,	explains	the	approach	adopted	by	the	Lords	in	Johnstone.		 In	considering	the	relation	between	civil	and	criminal	 law	in	 intellectual	property,	 this	 chapter	 fills	 an	 important	 gap	 in	 the	 existing	 literature.	To	date,	there	 has	 been	 little	 literature	 on	 this	 relation	 and	 this	 gives	 only	 cursory	attention	 to	 Johnstone. 17 	The	 exception	 here	 is	 Andreas	 Rahmatian’s	 2004	
Modern	 Law	 Review	 article	 ‘Trade	 Mark	 Infringement	 as	 a	 Criminal	 Offence’,	which	provides	an	analysis	of	all	aspects	of	the	Johnstone	decision,	including	the	relation	 between	 civil	 and	 criminal	 law.18	On	 the	 latter	 question,	 Rahmatian	struggled	 to	 understand	 why	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 did	 not	 assert	 a	 yet	 closer	relation	 between	 civil	 and	 criminal	 law	 concepts.19	Rahmatian	 advocated	 an	approach	treating	section	92	as	 ‘a	criminal	 infringement	provision,	 ie	based	on	civil	 infringement	and	containing	additional	aggravating	factors	which	together	trigger	criminal	responsibility’;20	after	all,	as	he	explained:		In	the	area	of	property	offences,	the	criminal	law	frequently	reverts	to	the	civil	law	when	interpreting	elements	of	the	actus	reus.	For	example,	the	element	‘property	belonging	to	another’,	in	section	1	of	the	Theft	Act	1968	…	is	determined	not	only	on	the	basis	of	sections	4	and	5	of	that	Act,	but	also	on	the	basis	of	civil	law.21		
                                                
17	Johnstone	 is	 given	 only	 cursory	 attention	 in	 C	 Sharp	 and	 J	 Smith,	 ‘The	 Interplay	 Between	 Civil	 and	Criminal	IP	Litigation	in	the	UK’	(2012)	7	Journal	of	Intellectual	Property	Law	&	Practice	8,	573–79.		18	A	Rahmatian,	‘Trade	Mark	Infringement	as	a	Criminal	Offence’	(2004)	67	Modern	Law	Review	4,	670–83,	675–77.	For	the	implications	of	Johnstone	for	Scottish	intellectual	property	law:	A	Rahmarian,	‘Vestiges	of	a	Scottish	Intellectual	Property	Law?’	(2004)	2	Juridical	Review	209–12.	19	Rahmatian,	Trade	Mark	Infringement	(n	18)	675:	‘Several	aspects	of	Johnstone	are	not	easy	to	understand.	One	is	the	argument	that	the	criminal	offence	has	to	be	seen	as	a	separate	entity	in	principle,	alongside	the	civil	infringement	law.’	20	ibid	676.	21	ibid.	
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	 This	 chapter,	 among	 other	 things,	 responds	 to	Rahmatian’s	 question.	 In	doing	 so,	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 appeal	 papers	 held	 at	 the	 Parliamentary	 Archives,	Westminster,22	which	reveal	that	analogies	with	theft	presented	in	argument	to	the	 Lords	 supported	 the	 opposite	 conclusion	 to	 that	 noted	by	Rahmatian:	 that	section	92	 should	be	 interpreted	without	 reference	 to	 the	 civil	 law.	As	we	will	see,	R	 v	 Johnstone,	 is	 a	 landmark	 in	 disassociating	 the	 elements	 of	 intellectual	property	 crime	 from	 theft	 for	 reasons	 different	 to	 those	 put	 forward	 by	Rahmatian.		 In	critically	analysing	the	decision	in	Johnstone,	this	chapter	also	draws	on	original	 research	 into	 the	 experience	 of	 criminalising	 trade	mark	 infringement	from	 a	 very	 different	 time	 and	 context:	 the	 mid-nineteenth	 century.	 The	important	 role	 that	 processes	 of	 criminalisation	 played	 in	 the	 making	 of	 the	modern	law	of	trade	marks	is	analysed,	focusing	on	the	history	of	the	first	statute	to	provide	protection	for	trade	marks	generally,	regardless	of	subject	matter:	the	Merchandise	 Marks	 Act	 1862.23	The	 experience	 of	 criminalisation	 from	 a	 very	different	time	and	context	enables	us	to	engage	more	critically	with	intellectual	property	 crime	 today,	 by	 shifting	 the	 focus	 from	 immediately	 obvious	explanations	for	the	ruling	in	Johnstone	(eg	objectives	of	EU	harmonisation	of	the	civil	trade	mark	law,	and	the	language	used	by	section	92)	and	drawing	attention	to	 underlying	 tensions	 in	 the	 law:	 both	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 today,	trade	 mark	 offences	 were	 caught	 between	 efficient	 enforcement	 and	 the	paradigm	of	 serious	crime	 involving	dishonesty	 (theft	 today	and	 forgery	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century).	 History,	 therefore,	 in	 taking	 our	 attention	 away	 from	 the	simple	explanations,	enables	us	to	identify	the	more	deep-seated	ambivalence	in	the	relation	between	intellectual	property	offences	and	paradigms	of	real	crime	today.			 This	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 I	 begin	 by	 presenting	 a	 detailed	account	 of	 the	 case	 of	 Johnstone,	 tracing	 its	 history	 through	 the	 rulings	 of	 the	
                                                
22	House	of	Lords	Appeal	Cases,	Series	3,	HL/PO/JU/4/3/2272,	held	by	Parliamentary	Archives,	Houses	of	Parliament,	Westminster,	London;	hereafter	‘Appeal	Papers’.		23	25	&	26	Vict.	
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Crown	 Court,	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 and	 finally	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 (section	 II).	 The	analysis	here	focuses	on	the	issue	of	the	relation	between	civil	and	criminal	law,	and	this	is	explained,	in	section	III,	by	reference	to	wider	criminal	law	categories.	Following	 this,	 in	 section	 IV,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 The	 Landmark	 Cases	series,	I	look	to	historical	antecedents	to	Johnstone:	the	story	of	criminalisation	in	the	making	of	 the	Merchandise	Marks	Act	1862.	As	 the	conclusion	 in	section	V	argues,	 while	 the	 context	 for	 the	 1862	 Act	 was	 very	 different,	 this	 broad	historical	 vantage	 point	 assists	 us	 to	 reflect	 more	 critically	 on	 Johnstone	 and	intellectual	property	crime	more	generally	today.		
2	The	Decision	in	R	v	Johnstone	
A	Facts	and	Background	In	October	1997,	a	package	containing	over	500	bootleg	CDs	and	related	artwork	was	sent	by	a	Robert	Alexander	Johnstone	through	the	post	and	delivered	to	the	wrong	address.	The	recipient	contacted	Polygram	Records	who,	in	turn,	alerted	the	police.	The	police	searched	 Johnstone’s	home	 in	New	Malden,	accompanied	by	a	representative	of	the	British	Phonographic	Industry,	and	found	around	500	further	 bootleg	 CDs	 and	 cassettes.	 The	 police	 also	 spoke	 to	 an	 employee	 of	Johnstone,	working	in	an	outhouse	to	Johnstone’s	home,	who	said	he	packed	400	to	500	such	CDs/cassettes	every	day.24			 Criminal	 proceedings	 were	 initiated	 in	 March	 1999.	 The	 indictment	contained	 12	 specimen	 counts	 under	 section	 92(1)(c)	 Trade	 Marks	 Act	 1994.	Each	 count	 alleged	 that	 Johnstone	 had	 in	 his	 possession,	 custody	 or	 control,	various	 bootleg	 CDs	 bearing	 the	 names	 of	 well-known	 music	 acts	 that	 were	registered	 trade	 marks	 (Bon	 Jovi,	 U2,	 The	 Rolling	 Stones,	 Rage	 Against	 the	Machine,	 Metallica,	 Simply	 Red),	 and	 recited	 the	 key	 elements	 of	 the	 offence	under	 section	 92(1)(c).	25	Section	 92(1)(c)	 provides	 that	 ‘a	 person	 commits	 an	
                                                
24	‘Agreed	Statement	of	Facts	and	Issues’	paras	1.1–1.4,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22).	25	‘Indictment’,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22).		
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offence	who,	with	a	view	to	gain	for	himself	or	another,	or	with	intent	to	cause	loss	 to	 another,	 and	 without	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 proprietor	 …	 has	 in	 his	possession,	custody	or	control	in	the	course	of	a	business	any	such	goods	with	a	view	to	the	doing	of	anything,	by	himself	or	another,	which	would	be	in	offence’	under	 section	 92(1)(b).	 Section	 92(1)(b)	 criminalises	 unauthorised	 acts	 of	selling,	letting	for	hire,	offering	or	exposing	for	sale	or	hire	or	distributing	‘goods	which	bear,	or	the	packaging	of	which	bears,	a	sign	that	is	identical	or,	or	likely	to	be	 mistaken	 for	 a	 registered	 trade	 mark’,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 gain	 for	 himself	 or	another	or	with	intent	to	cause	loss	to	another.	
B	The	Crown	Court	Proceedings		Kingston	 Crown	 Court	 heard	 the	 case	 in	 October	 1999,	 before	 Judge	Mitchell.	Johnstone	 began	 by	 pleading	 not	 guilty.	His	Defence	 Case	 Statement	 explained	that	the	‘general	nature	of	his	defence’	was	that	the	use	of	the	signs	in	question	(Bon	Jovi,	U2,	etc)	was	not	‘trade	mark	use’;26	rather	the	signs	merely	indicated	who	the	performers	were.27	If	that	argument	was	not	accepted,	the	Defence	Case	Statement	 indicated	 that	 Johnstone	wished	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 statutory	 defence	 in	section	 92(5)	 Trade	Marks	Act	 1994.28	This	 provides	 that	 it	 is	 ‘a	 defence	 for	 a	person	charged	with	an	offence	under	 this	section	 to	show	that	he	believed	on	reasonable	grounds	that	the	use	of	the	sign	in	the	manner	in	which	it	was	used,	or	 was	 to	 be	 used,	 was	 not	 an	 infringement	 of	 the	 registered	 trade	mark.’	 To	support	these	points,	Johnstone	claimed	that	he	had	been	advised	by	a	reputable	trade	mark	 attorney	 that	 his	 use	 of	 the	 signs	 in	 question	was	 not	 trade	mark	infringement.29			 Before	 the	 jury	 was	 appointed,	 Judge	 Mitchell	 ruled	 on	 a	 preliminary	point.	 Counsel	 for	 Johnstone	 argued	 that,	 when	 the	 jury	 came	 to	 consider	 the	
                                                
26	‘Agreed	Statement	of	Facts	and	Issues’,	para.	2.3,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22).	27	R	v	Johnstone,	CA,	[34].	28	‘Agreed	Statement	of	Facts	and	Issues’,	para.	2.3,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22).	29	ibid	para	2.4.	
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statutory	defence	under	section	92(5),	they	should	be	directed	to	have	regard	to	the	civil	infringement	and	defence	provisions	of	sections	9–11	Trade	Marks	Act;	civil	liability	under	sections	9–11	should	be	a	prerequisite	to	a	finding	of	criminal	liability	under	section	92.30	This	was	because,	as	well	as	arguing	that	there	was	no	 ‘trade	mark	use’,	 Johnstone	wished	 to	rely	on	section	11(2)(b)	of	 the	Trade	Marks	Act	which	provides	that	 ‘the	use	of	 indications	concerning	the	kind	…	or	other	characteristics	of	goods’	 is	not	an	 infringement,	 if	 this	was	 in	accordance	with	 ‘honest	 practices	 in	 industrial	 or	 commercial	 matters’.	 Johnstone’s	argument	was	 that	 the	 signs	 in	question	merely	 indicated	who	 the	performers	were.31		 Following	other	decisions	at	Crown	Court	level,	32	Judge	Mitchell	rejected	these	submissions;	he	held	that	the	criminal	provisions	in	section	92	‘stand	alone	and	should	in	no	way	be	connected	to	the	civil	or	tortious	aspect	that	is	created	within	 this	 Act’.33	In	 particular,	 the	 word	 ‘infringement’	 in	 section	 92,	 merely	denoted	 ‘unauthorised	 use’	 of	 a	mark,	 and	 not	 infringement	 as	 determined	 by	reference	 to	 the	 civil	 law	 of	 trade	 marks.34	Following	 this	 ruling,	 Johnstone	changed	 his	 plea	 to	 guilty.	 He	 was	 sentenced	 to	 six	 months’	 imprisonment,	concurrent,	 on	 each	 count.	 In	 addition,	 a	 confiscation	 order	 was	 imposed,	 by	consent,	 for	 £130,181.24	 (to	 be	 paid	 within	 18	 months,	 with	 three	 years’	imprisonment	in	default),	as	well	as	orders	for	forfeiture	of	all	materials	seized	by	 the	 police	 during	 their	 investigations. 35 	This	 was	 Johnstone’s	 second	conviction	for	an	offence	of	this	kind.36	
C	The	Appeal	to	the	Court	of	Appeal	
                                                
30	‘Ruling	of	His	Honour	Judge	Mitchell	of	25	October	1999’,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22).	31	R	v	Johnstone,	CA,	[10].	The	House	of	Lords	referred	to	the	reliance	on	s	11(2)(b)	as	an	alternative	to	the	defence	in	s	92(5),	see	R	v	Johnstone,	HL,	[21].	32	R	v	Johnstone,	CA	[10].		33	‘Ruling	of	His	Honour	Judge	Mitchell	of	25	October	1999’,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22).		34	ibid.	35	‘Criminal	Appeal	Office	Summary’,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22).	36	R	v	Johnstone,	CA,	[12].	
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Leave	to	appeal	to	the	Court	of	Appeal	against	the	conviction	was	then	granted	in	relation	 to	 a	 number	 of	 questions,	 concerning	 different	 facets	 of	 the	 relation	between	civil	and	criminal	law.	First,	was	it	necessary	for	the	Crown	to	prove	the	civil	 infringement	of	a	registered	trade	mark	under	sections	9–11	Trade	Marks	Act	 1994,	 in	 a	 prosecution	 under	 section	 92(1)?	 Secondly,	 could	 a	 defendant	relying	on	the	statutory	defence	in	section	92(5)	also	rely	on	the	civil	sections	of	9–11	 Trade	 Marks	 Act?	 More	 specifically,	 did	 the	 words	 ‘infringement	 of	 a	registered	trade	mark’	in	section	92(5)	denote	civil	infringement?	Thirdly,	if	civil	infringement	was	not	a	prerequisite	to	the	offence	under	section	92,	was	section	92	compatible	with	the	EU	Trade	Marks	Directive	(89/104/EEC),	which	sought	to	harmonise	aspects	of	the	civil	law	of	trade	marks?37			 In	January	2002,	the	Court	of	Appeal	allowed	Johnstone’s	appeal.	Tuckey	LJ,	 delivering	 a	 judgment	with	which	 Pumfrey	 and	 Burton	 JJ	 agreed,	 held	 that	‘unless	there	is	a	civil	infringement,	there	can	be	no	offence	under	section	92’.38	First,	this	was	the	proper	interpretation	of	the	words	of	section	92:	the	reference	to	 ‘infringement’	 in	 section	 92(5)	was	 to	 civil	 infringement;	 the	 interpretation	section	 (section	 104)	 defined	 ‘infringement’	 by	 reference	 to	 sections	 9(1)–(2)	and	 10	 concerning	 civil	 infringement.	 While	 section	 104	 did	 not	 expressly	mention	 the	 defences	 in	 section	 11	 and	 12,	 it	would	 be	 ‘nonsense’	 for	 section	92(5)	to	provide	a	defence	when	a	defendant	had	a	reasonable	belief	that	there	was	no	civil	 infringement,	when	 the	absence	of	 civil	 infringement	would	be	no	defence.39	Further,	if	the	defences	under	sections	11	and	12	were	not	available	to	a	defendant	under	section	92,	then	there	would	be	an	inconsistency	with	the	EU	Directive40	that	 seeks	 to	harmonise	 ‘substantive	 rules	of	 central	 importance’	 to	trade	mark	 law.41	That	cannot	have	been	the	 intention	of	Parliament.	However,	
                                                
37	‘Criminal	Appeal	Office	Summary’,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22),	and	R	v	Johnstone,	CA	[2].	There	was	also	a	fourth	question:	whether	the	penalties	under	section	92(6)	(a	maximum	sentence	of	ten	years’	imprisonment	or	an	unlimited	fine,	or	both)	were	compliant	with	the	Treaty	of	Rome,	Art	5.	See	text	to	n	75	below.	38	R	v	Johnstone,	CA,	[46].	39	ibid.	40	ibid	[53].	41	ibid,	citing	C-355/96	Silhouette	International	v	Hartlauer	[1998]	ECR	I-4799	[23].	
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to	avoid	unnecessary	complexity	for	juries,	the	prosecution	would	not	be	obliged	to	prove	civil	 infringement	 in	every	case;	rather	 it	was	for	the	defendant	to	set	out	in	his	Defence	Statement	the	civil	 law	provisions	upon	which	he	relied,	and	the	onus	would	be	on	the	Crown	to	disprove	that	case.42			 Accordingly,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 held	 that	 Johnstone	 should	 have	 been	free	 to	run	 the	arguments	set	out	 in	his	Defence	Statement:	 that	 the	use	of	 the	sign	was	not	trade	mark	use	and	not	civil	infringement	under	section	11(2)(b).43	Though	 the	 Court	 had	 doubts	 as	 to	 whether	 these	 defences	 would	 succeed	 in	most	 cases	 of	 bootlegging,44	his	 conviction	 was	 unsafe	 and	 was	 overturned.	However,	as	Johnstone	had	served	his	prison	sentence,	a	retrial	was	not	ordered.	
D	The	Appeal	to	the	House	of	Lords	The	prosecutions	then	appealed	to	the	House	of	Lords.	The	question	before	the	Lords	was,	as	expressed	by	Lord	Nicholls,	 ‘whether	it	 is	a	defence	to	a	criminal	charge	 under	 section	 92	 …	 that	 the	 defendant’s	 acts	 do	 not	 amount	 to	 a	 civil	infringement	of	a	trade	mark’	per	Lord	Nicholls;45	or,	as	stated	by	Lord	Walker,	‘whether	a	person	can	be	convicted	of	an	offence	under	section	92	for	acts	which	do	not	amount	to	civil	infringement	of	a	registered	trade	mark’.46	Counsel	for	the	prosecution	reiterated	the	argument	put	forward	in	the	courts	below:	section	92	was	a	self-contained	provision;	all	the	ingredients	of	the	offence	appeared	on	the	face	 of	 the	 section.	 In	 particular,	 Parliament	 cannot	 have	 intended	 civil	infringement	to	be	introduced	into	the	criminal	courts	because	offences	needed	to	 be	 simple	 so	 jurors,	 lay	 magistrates	 and	 local	 trading	 standard	 authorities	could	understand	them.47		
                                                
42	ibid	[48].	43	ibid	[68].		44	ibid	[35]	and	[48]	point	(b).	45	R	v	Johnstone,	HL,	[25],	per	Lord	Nicholls.	46ibid	[61],	per	Lord	Walker.	47	ibid	[25].	
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	 The	House	of	Lords,	like	the	Court	of	Appeal	below,	accepted	Johnstone’s	arguments.	However,	 the	nature	of	 the	 relation	between	criminal	 and	civil	 law	was	differently	 stated;	Lord	Nicholls,	who	delivered	a	 judgment	with	which	all	the	other	Lords	agreed,48	characterised	the	House	of	Lords	approach	as	involving	‘a	more	confined	process	of	interpretation’	than	that	of	the	Court	of	Appeal.49	On	the	one	hand,	 the	House	of	Lords	accepted	that	 ‘the	 ingredients	of	 the	offences	created	by	section	92	are	to	be	found	within	the	section	itself’.50	As	Lord	Walker	explained,	 in	 his	 concurring	 judgment,	 this	 approach	 was	 supported	 by	 the	difference	in	language	between	section	92	and	the	civil	infringement	sections	9–11	(for	example,	section	92	refers	to	‘likely	to	be	mistaken’	instead	of	‘likelihood	of	confusion’	and	‘in	the	course	of	a	business’	rather	than	‘in	the	course	of	trade’).	Lord	Walker	argued	that	this	indicated:		Parliament’s	natural	anxiety	to	frame	the	offence-creating	provisions	of	the	1994	Act	so	as	to	be	as	self-contained	and	simple	a	code	as	possible.	Prosecutions	under	section	92	are	heard	either	in	the	magistrates’	court	or	in	the	Crown	Court	and	would	be	burdensome	if	lay	magistrates	and	juries	regularly	had	to	go	into	the	intricacies	of	the	law	of	civil	infringement.51	However,	 notwithstanding	 this,	 the	 words	 ‘without	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 [trade	mark]	proprietor’	in	section	92	denoted	that	the	conduct	to	be	criminalised	was	conduct	 to	which	 the	proprietor	 could	 object.	 Therefore,	 implicit	 in	 section	92	was	the	requirement	that	the	defendant’s	use	be	 ‘use	as	a	trade	mark’.	As	Lord	Nicholls	explained:		Parliament	cannot	have	intended	to	criminalise	conduct	which	could	lawfully	be	done	without	the	proprietor’s	consent	…	That	would	be	to	extend,	by	means	of	a	criminal	sanction,	the	scope	of	the	rights	of	the	proprietor.52	
                                                
48	This	included	Lord	Walker,	who	delivered	a	concurring	judgment:	R	v	Johnstone,	HL,	[88].	The	other	Lords	were:	Lord	Hope,	Lord	Hutton	and	Lord	Rodger.	49	ibid	[33].	50	ibid,	HL	[26].	51	ibid	[73].	52	ibid	[28].	
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A	number	of	points	 supported	 this	 interpretation.	First,	 the	wording	of	 section	92(5);	‘it	would	make	no	sense	for	reasonable	belief	in	non-infringement	to	be	a	defence,	 if	 infringement	 was	 irrelevant	 so	 far	 as	 the	 criminal	 offences	 are	concerned’.53	Further,	 the	1994	Act	was	to	be	 interpreted,	so	 far	as	possible,	 to	accord	with	the	harmonising	objectives	of	the	EU	Trade	Mark	Directive.54			 The	 result	 in	 R	 v	 Johnstone,	 therefore,	 is	 that	 notwithstanding	 the	intention	 to	 make	 the	 criminal	 offences	 simple	 for	 juries,	 lay	 magistrates	 and	trading	 standards,	 that	 civil	 trade	 mark	 concepts	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 criminal	offences	in	section	92;	the	House	of	Lords	rejected	the	Crown	Court	approach	at	first	instance	that	treated	section	92	as	a	completely	self-contained	provision.	At	first	glance,	the	relevance	of	civil	trade	mark	concepts	to	section	92	might	seem	unremarkable.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 considerations	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Trade	Marks	Act	 1994,	 that	 clearly	point	 to	 this	 conclusion:	 the	EU	harmonisation	of	the	civil	trade	mark	law	and	the	wording	of	section	92(5).55	Indeed,	as	Andreas	Rahmatian	 argued	 in	 his	Modern	 Law	 Review	 article,	 perhaps	 the	 noteworthy	aspect	 of	 Johnstone	 is	 rather	 that	 the	 Lords	 did	 not	 advocate	 an	 even	 closer	relation	between	civil	 and	criminal	 law,	 such	 that	 the	 civil	 law	of	 infringement	more	 generally	 was	 a	 necessary	 part	 of	 section	 92.56	With	 these	 questions	 in	mind,	the	next	section	addresses	how	the	relationship	between	civil	and	criminal	law	in	Johnstone	is	to	be	explained,	and	it	does	so	by	first	considering	the	more	general	position	of	intellectual	property	offences	in	the	categories	of	the	criminal	law.		
3	Explaining	R	v	Johnstone	
A	Intellectual	Property	Offences	and	the	Criminal	Law	
                                                
53	ibid	[29].	54	ibid	[31],	referring	to	Council	Directive	89/104/EEC	of	21	December	1988.	55	See	text	to	nn	53	and	54.	56	Rahmatian,	‘Trade	Mark	Infringement	as	a	Criminal	Offence’	(n	18)	675–76.	
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What	is	the	position	of	intellectual	property	offences	within	the	criminal	law?	On	the	 one	 hand,	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 authorities	 on	 sentencing	 have	 characterised	criminal	 offences	 in	 intellectual	 property	 statutes	 as	 serious	 crimes	 involving	dishonesty,	analogous	to	theft.	In	R	v	Carter,	the	Court	of	Appeal	heard	an	appeal	against	 a	 sentence	 imposed	by	 a	 Crown	Court	 for	 nine	months’	 imprisonment,	suspended	 for	 two	 years,	 to	 run	 concurrently	 on	 two	 counts,	 in	 respect	 of	offences	of	making	and	distributing	 infringing	 copies	of	videotapes	 contrary	 to	section	107	Copyright	Designs	and	Patents	Act	1988.	The	defendant	had	pleaded	guilty	and	had	no	relevant	previous	convictions.	The	Court	of	Appeal	refused	to	interfere	with	the	sentence	imposed	by	the	Crown	Court,	Jowitt	J	remarking	that:	it	has	to	be	borne	in	mind	that	the	counterfeiting	of	video	films	is	a	serious	offence.	In	effect,	to	make	and	distribute	pirate	copies	of	films	is	to	steal	from	the	true	owner	of	the	copyright	…	It	is	an	offence	really	of	dishonesty.57	Similar	 comments	 were	 made	 in	 R	 v	 Adam	 Ahmed	 Bhad,	 an	 appeal	 over	sentencing	under	 section	92	Trade	Marks	Act	1994.	While	 the	Court	of	Appeal	doubted	whether	‘the	custody	threshold	was	in	truth	crossed’	in	the	case	of	the	activities	in	question	(an	‘isolated	lapse’	of	an	otherwise	‘honest	business’	which	was	a	 ‘small	scale	operation’),	Bingham	CJ	nevertheless	described	section	92	as	follows:		The	owners	of	trade	marks	have	a	commercial	asset	which	is	entitled	to	legal	protection.	Deliberately	using	someone	else’s	trade	mark	is	in	effect	to	steal	their	commercial	goodwill.	This	is	properly	a	criminal	offence	and	a	penalty	must	follow	on	conviction.	58		 On	the	other	hand,	in	case	law	on	the	elements	of	the	offence,	the	courts	have	 treated	 intellectual	 property	 offences	 as	 regulatory	 offences,	 that	 is,	statutory	 offences	 regulating	 an	 activity	 in	 the	 public	 interest	 and	 ‘not	 truly	criminal’	in	nature.59	For	example,	a	well-established	principle	of	criminal	law	is	
                                                
57	R	v	Carter	[1993]	FSR	303,	304	(CA).	58	R	v	Adam	Ahmed	Bhad	(1999)	Cr	App	R	(s)	139,	142.	59	R	v	Lambert	[2001]	UKHL	37,	[154]	per	Lord	Clyde.	Lord	Clyde	gave	as	an	‘obvious	example’	of	regulatory	provisions,	offences	requiring	a	licence	to	carry	out	an	activity.	He	considered	the	‘promotion	of	health	and	safety	and	the	avoidance	of	pollution’	as	‘among	the	purposes	of	such	controls’.	
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that	 the	 courts	 should	 apply	 a	 presumption	 of	 mens	 rea	 in	 interpreting	 a	statutory	 provision	 creating	 a	 criminal	 offence.	 As	 Lord	 Reid	 explained	 in	 the	House	of	Lords	ruling	in	Sweet	v	Parsley:		whenever	a	section	is	silent	as	to	mens	rea	there	is	a	presumption	that,	in	order	to	give	effect	to	the	will	of	Parliament,	we	must	read	in	words	appropriate	to	require	mens	rea.60			 Whereas	 the	 presumption	 is	 ‘particularly	 strong’	 for	 offences	 that	 are	‘truly	criminal’	in	character,61	it	can	be	displaced	for	offences	concerning	‘quasi-criminal	 acts’.62	In	R	v	Keane,	 it	was	 argued	 that	 the	 presumption	 of	mens	 rea	should	apply	to	section	92(1);	rejecting	this	argument,	the	Court	of	Appeal	stated	obiter	 that	 section	 92	 falls	 within	 the	 ‘quasi-criminal’	 or	 regulatory	 category	(though	clearly	stating	that	it	did	not	wish	to	decide	the	issue).63	In	a	subsequent	case,	R	v	S,	it	was	argued	that	the	statutory	defence	in	section	92(5),	in	providing	a	mens	rea	 element,	was	an	 ‘essential	 element’	of	 the	offence	under	 section	92	(such	that	placing	a	legal	burden	of	proof	on	the	defendant	to	prove	the	elements	of	92(5)	would	conflict	with	the	presumption	of	innocence	under	Art	6(2)	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights).64	Rejecting	this	argument,	the	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	‘dishonesty	…	is	not	the	gravamen	of	the	offence’	under	section	92.65	Rather,	as	Davis	J	explained,	in	a	judgment	with	which	the	other	members	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	agreed:	Section	92	is	a	regulatory	provision	and	the	strong	policy	behind	the	1994	Act,	and	mischief	at	which	it	is	aimed,	support	the	view	that	the	use	of	such	technique	in	this	context	is	neither	unprincipled	or	arbitrary:	the	
                                                
60	Sweet	v	Parsley	[1970]	AC	132	(HL),	148.		61	In	Gammon	v	Attorney	General	of	Hong	Kong,	[1985]	AC	1,	12,	the	Privy	Council	held	that	the	presumption	of	mens	 rea	 is	 ‘particularly	 strong	where	 the	 offence	 is	 “truly	 criminal”	 in	 character’,	 and	 that	 the	 ‘only	situation’	 in	 which	 the	 presumption	 could	 be	 displaced	 is	 where	 a	 statute	 concerned	 an	 ‘issue	 of	 social	concern’	 (eg	public	 safety)	 and	 ‘greater	 vigilance	 to	prevent	 the	 commission	of	 the	prohibited	act’	would	result.	62	Sweet	v	Parsley	[1970]	AC	132,	149–50,	per	Lord	Reid.	63	R	v	Keane	[2001]	FSR	7	[28],	per	Mance	LJ.	64	R	v	S	[2002]	EWCA	Crim	2258,	[22].	65	ibid	[30].		
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unauthorised	use	of	trade	marks	is	the	target	of	the	legislation	and	the	substance	of	the	offence.66		 The	classification	of	section	92	as	 ‘regulatory’	was	also	one	factor	which	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	R	v	S	considered	to	justify	the	defendant	bearing	the	legal	burden	 of	 proof	 under	 section	 92(5), 67 	and	 this	 reasoning	 was	 expressly	endorsed	 by	 Lord	 Nicholls	 in	 Johnstone. 68 	As	 Lord	 Nicholls	 acknowledged,	referring	to	the	much	cited	dicta	of	Auld	LJ	in	Torbay	Council	v	Satnam	Singh,	‘the	offences	in	section	92	have	rightly	been	described	as	offences	of	“near	absolute	liability”.’ 69 	Justifying	 the	 regulatory	 classification	 is	 the	 ‘very	 considerable	public	importance	in	preventing	the	trade	in	counterfeit	goods’.	70	In	R	v	S,	Davis	J	explained	this	‘public	interest’	as	follows:	the	result	of	fewer	prosecutions	would	be	that:		the	interests	of	the	economy,	of	innocent	consumers	and	of	legitimate	businesses	would	suffer	…	the	DTI	in	December	2001	estimated	that	counterfeiting	or	IP	crime	generally	was	estimated	to	cost	the	UK	economy	some	£9	billion	per	year	and	was	responsible	for	prospective	job	losses	in	legitimate	businesses	of	over	4,000	people.	There	is	a	very	strong	public	interest	in	seeking	to	limit	or	prevent	such	an	eventuality.71		The	 case	 law	 on	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 offence,	 sits	 uneasily	 with	 the	 Court	 of	Appeal	 dicta	 on	 sentencing	 in	R	v	Carter	and	R	v	Adam	Ahmed	Bhad;	while	 the	courts	may	 legitimately	 impose	tougher	sentences	 for	offences	of	strict	 liability	
                                                
66	ibid	[34].		67	ibid	[48]	point	(4).	68	R	v	Johnstone,	HL,	[54].		69	ibid	 [52],	 referring	 to	dicta	 of	Auld	LJ	 in	Torbay	Council	v	Satnam	Singh,	2000	FSR	158,	 161:	 ‘At	 a	 first	sight,	this	near	absolute	liability	may	seem	harsh,	especially	when	it	 is	noted	from	section	92(6)(b)	of	the	Act	that	the	offence	carries	a	maximum	penalty	on	indictment	of	an	unlimited	fine	or	imprisonment	up	to	10	years	or	both.	However,	if	the	regime	introduced	by	the	Act	is	to	operate	as	an	effective	protection	both	to	registered	proprietors	of	trade	marks	and	consumers,	 it	cannot	sensibly	depend	on	proof	in	every	case	of	the	trader’s	knowledge	of	the	existence	of	the	registration	…	or	on	his	rebuttal	of	the	assertion	that	he	was	unaware	of	the	registration	or	its	detail’.	This	dicta	has	been	approved	in	R	v	Keane	[2001]	FSR	7,	[24]	per	Mance	LJ	and	R	v	S	[2002]	EWCA	Crim.	2558,	[17]	per	Davis	J.	70	R	v	Rachel	McCrudden	2005	EWCA	466,	[10]:	 ‘It	seems	to	us	that	the	provisions	contained	in	section	92	have	been	devised	 to	constitute	a	 rigorous	statutory	code	 involving	offences	 initially	of	 strict	 liability,	 for	the	 plain	 policy	 reason	 that	 there	 is	 very	 considerable	 public	 importance	 in	 preventing	 the	 trade	 in	counterfeit	goods’.	71	R	v	S,	[48]	point	7.		
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where	there	is	evidence	that	the	defendant	had	knowledge,72	the	Court	of	Appeal	dicta	 on	 sentencing	 places	weight	 on	 aspects	 that	 are	 not	 formally	 part	 of	 the	offence.73	How	can	the	tension	 implicit	 in	these	characterisations	of	 intellectual	property	offences	be	explained?	On	one	level	this	reflects	the	lack	of	coherence	of	criminal	law	categories	more	generally.	As	criminal	law	scholarship	has	shown,	the	 distinction	 between	 strict	 liability	 and	 fault	 liability,	 ‘from	 a	 legal	 point	 of	view’,	 is	 ‘fraught	 with	 difficulty’;	 there	 has	 been	 a	 ‘failure’	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	courts	 to	 provide	 a	 clear	 legal	 criteria	 for	 the	 distinction	 between	 these	 two	categories	 of	 offences,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 judges	 ‘fall	 back	 into	 specific	judgments	about	the	rights	and	wrongs	in	individual	cases’.74			 Further,	as	the	Court	of	Appeal	judgment	in	Johnstone	notes,	the	activities	caught	by	section	92	occupy	a	broad	ground:	The	seriousness	of	trade	mark	infringement	occupies	a	spectrum	running	from	the	comparatively	trivial	to	the	very	serious	…	Counterfeiting	is	certainly	a	potentially	serious	offence,	there	being	large	sums	of	money	to	be	dishonestly	made	by	the	deliberate	counterfeiter.	As	 Tuckey	 LJ	 continued,	 at	 the	 ‘top	 end’,	 the	 activities	 caught	 by	 section	 92	constitute	a	‘serious	offence	of	dishonesty’,	for	which	the	maximum	penalties	of	ten	 years	 and/or	 an	 unlimited	 fine	 are	 appropriate.75	Yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	section	 92	 also	 encompasses	more	 trivial	 acts	 not	 involving	 dishonesty,	which	are	criminalised	in	the	public	interest,	on	a	regulatory	rationale.	Hence,	in	R	v	S	the	Court	of	Appeal	noted	that	‘the	reality’	of	sentencing	under	section	92,	is	that	
                                                
72	R	v	Lester	(1975)	73	Cr	App	R	144,	discussed	in	J	Roberts,	N	Padfield,	L	Harris,	Current	Sentencing	Practice	(London,	Sweet	and	Maxwell,	2016)	L2-2B01.	73	I	am	grateful	to	James	Chalmers	for	discussion	on	this	point.	74	A	 Norrie,	 Crime	 Reason	 and	 History:	 A	 Critical	 Introduction	 to	 Criminal	 Law,	 3rd	 edn	 (Cambridge,	Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2014)	 103–04.	 See	 also	 G	 Williams,	 Textbook	 of	 Criminal	 Law,	 2nd	 edn	(London,	Stevens	&	Sons,	1983)	934:	‘In	general,	the	authorities	on	strict	liability	are	so	conflicting	that	it	is	impossible	to	abstract	any	coherent	principle	on	when	this	form	of	liability	arises	and	when	it	does	not.	A	particular	proposition	affirming	strict	liability	can	almost	always	be	matched	by	its	contradictory	affirming	fault	liability’	cited	in	Norrie,	Crime	Reason	and	History	102.	75	R	 v	 Johnstone,	 HL,	 [58]–[59].	 These	 comments	 were	 made	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal,	 in	 rejecting	 the	argument	 that	 the	 long	maximum	penalties	 (a	maximum	of	 ten	years’	 imprisonment	and/or	an	unlimited	fine)	were	disproportionate,	and	therefore	incompatible	with	Article	5	Treaty	of	Rome.	Article	5	Treaty	of	Rome	 requires	 penalties	 to	 be	 ‘effective,	 proportionate	 and	 dissuasive’.	 As	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 noted	 in	
Johnstone,	the	maximum	punishment	of	ten	years’	imprisonment	and/or	an	unlimited	fine	is	on	a	par	with	offences	under	the	Theft	Act	1968	(obtaining	property	by	deception,	section	15)	and	the	offence	of	forgery	(under	section	6	Forgery	and	Counterfeiting	Act	1981):	see	R	v	Johnstone,	CA,	[58].	
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‘most	cases	under	section	92	are	brought	in	the	magistrates’	court	and,	of	those,	the	 majority	 result	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 conviction)	 in	 a	 fine’.	 In	 that	 case	 the	prosecution,	 without	 challenge	 from	 defence	 counsel,	 cited	 figures	 that	 fewer	than	ten	per	cent	of	convictions	in	the	Crown	Court	or	magistrates’	court	(in	the	period	1998–2000)	resulted	in	an	immediate	custodial	sentences’.76	In	this	way,	while	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	case	law	on	sentencing	has	characterised	section	92	as	a	serious	offence	involving	dishonesty,	case	law	on	liability	instead	draws	on	the	‘reality’	of	sentencing	in	the	lower	courts;	in	case	law	on	liability,	the	‘reality’	of	 sentencing	 is	 a	 means	 of	 justifying	 the	 regulatory	 classification	 and	distinguishing	 section	 92	 from	 other	 offences	 where	 the	 availability	 of	 long	maximum	 penalties	 has	 instead	 supported	 the	 rejection	 of	 a	 regulatory	classification.77	The	 broad	 range	 of	 activity	 regulated	 by	 intellectual	 property	crime,	then,	in	combination	with	the	lack	of	clarity	about	criminal	law	categories,	results	in	contradictory	characterisations	by	the	criminal	law.		
B	R	v	Johnstone	and	the	Relation	between	Civil	and	Criminal	Law	How	does	uncovering	the	position	of	intellectual	property	offences	in	the	wider	criminal	 law	 improve	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 ruling	 in	
Johnstone?	 First,	 it	 helps	 us	 to	 understand	 the	 question	 that	 perplexed	Rahmatian	 in	 his	Modern	Law	Review	article:	 why	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 did	 not	advocate	a	yet	closer	relation	between	criminal	and	civil	law,	such	that	the	civil	law	of	 infringement	 is	part	of	 the	offence	 in	section	92.78	Rahmatian	addressed	one	 explanation	 for	 the	 Lords’	 —the	 need	 for	 juries	 and	 lay	 magistrates	 to	understand	 section	 92—and	 rightly	 noted	 that	 this	 was	 not	 convincing	 on	 its	own;	 juries	 and	 lay	 magistrates	 are	 often	 confronted	 with	 complex	 areas	 of	
                                                
76	R	v	S,	[48].	77	ibid.	Referring	to	offences	under	the	Misuse	of	Drugs	Act	1971	considered	 in	R	v	Lambert	 [2001]	UKHL	37.	78	Rahmatian,	 Trade	 Mark	 Infringement	 as	 a	 Criminal	 Offence	 (n	 18)	 676:	 ‘there	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 a	convincing	reason	why	an	artificially	independent	building	of	criminal	law	has	to	be	erected	adjacent	to	the	civil	law	edifice’.	
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criminal	 law. 79 	The	 analysis	 in	 the	 last	 section	 perhaps	 provides	 a	 more	convincing	 answer	 to	 Rahmatian’s	 question:	 the	 ‘strong	 public	 interest’	 to	 be	served	 in	 facilitating	 efficient	 prosecutions	 by	 trading	 standards	 departments,	essential	 to	 counter	 the	 economic	 cost	 of	 piracy	 and	 counterfeiting.	 These	concerns	 appear	 prominently	 in	 the	 judgments	 in	 Johnstone;	 the	 judgments	 of	both	 Lord	 Nicholls	 and	 Lord	 Walker	 open	 by	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 high	economic	 cost	 of	 ‘piracy	 and	 counterfeiting’,	 accounting	 for	 between	 five	 and	seven	per	cent	of	world	trade	and	costing	the	UK	some	£9	billion	per	year,80	and	Lord	Nicholls	expressly	mentioned	the	need	for	an	approach	that	does	not	cause	‘practical	 difficulties	 for	 weights	 and	 measures	 authorities’.81	In	 this	 way,	 the	context	 for	 the	 Lords’	 interpretation	 of	 section	 92	 included	 the	 very	 public	interest	concerns	that	have	supported	its	treatment	as	a	regulatory	offence,	and	in	turn	justifies	an	approach	that	treats	section	92	as	a	‘rigorous	statutory	code’	that	is	simple	in	application.82			 The	 position	 of	 intellectual	 property	 offences	 within	 criminal	 law	categories	 also	helps	 explain	why	 the	Lords	did	not	 pursue	 analogies	 between	section	 92	 and	 the	 law	 of	 theft.	 The	 appeal	 papers	 held	 at	 the	 Parliamentary	Archives	 reveal	 that	 counsel	 for	 the	 prosecution	 contended	 that	 the	independence	of	 the	criminal	offences	 in	 section	92	 from	 the	civil	 law	of	 trade	marks	was	supported	by	analogising	intellectual	property	crime	to	theft.	83	In	R	v	
Hinks,	the	House	of	Lords	held	that	the	crime	of	theft	(set	out	in	section	1,	Theft	Act	1968)	encompassed	conduct	which	was	not	actionable	under	civil	law;84	the	majority	held	that	a	defendant	could	 ‘appropriate’	property	for	the	purposes	of	theft,	even	though	good	title	had	been	acquired	by	the	defendant	under	civil	law	
                                                
79	ibid	677.	80	R	v	Johnstone,	HL,	[1],	[59].	81	ibid	[32]	per	Lord	Nicholls.	82	R	v	Rachel	McCrudden,	[10],	quoted	above	n	72.	83	‘Case	for	the	Appellant’,	Appeal	Papers	(n	22),	para	7.12.	84	R	v	Hinks	[2001]	2	AC	241.	
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(in	 the	 case	 in	 question,	 by	way	 of	 gift).	 As	 Lord	 Steyn,	 delivering	 a	 judgment	with	which	a	majority	of	the	Lords	agreed,	explained:		The	purposes	of	the	civil	law	and	the	criminal	law	are	somewhat	different.	In	theory	the	two	systems	should	be	in	perfect	harmony.	In	a	practical	world	there	will	sometimes	be	disharmony	between	the	two	systems.	In	any	event,	it	would	be	wrong	to	assume	on	a	priori	grounds	that	the	criminal	law	rather	than	the	civil	law	is	defective85		On	this	basis,	Lord	Steyn	concluded	that	the	‘tension	between	civil	and	criminal	law’	was	‘not	a	factor	which	justified	a	departure’	from	existing	criminal	law	case	law.86	Indeed,	there	was,	in	fact,	a	benefit	to	the	independence	of	the	criminal	law	from	civil	law	concepts:		while	in	some	contexts	of	the	law	of	theft	a	judge	cannot	avoid	explaining	civil	law	concepts	to	a	jury	…	the	decisions	of	the	House	of	Lords	eliminate	the	need	for	such	explanations	in	respect	of	appropriation.	That	is	a	great	advantage	in	an	overly	complex	corner	of	the	law.87		 The	ruling	in	Hinks	has	been	much	criticised	by	criminal	law	scholars	for	‘the	 conflict	 it	 creates	 between	 the	 civil	 and	 criminal	 law’.88 	However,	 the	analysis	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 suggests	 that	 the	 decision	 not	 to	 follow	 that	approach	 in	 the	 case	 of	 intellectual	 property	 offences	 is	 best	 explained	 by	 the	differences	between	these	offences	and	theft;	while	case	law	on	sentencing	might	invoke	comparisons	with	theft,	as	regards	the	elements	of	the	action,	section	92	is	treated	as	regulatory	in	nature	and	not	like	theft	at	all.	Indeed,	in	Hinks,	Lord	Steyn	 was	 complacent	 about	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 civil	 and	 criminal	 law	precisely	because	 ‘the	mental	requirements	of	 theft	are	an	adequate	protection	against	 injustice’;89	theft,	 then,	 unlike	 intellectual	 property	 crime,	 is	 an	 offence	
                                                
85	ibid	252.	86	ibid,	referring	to	the	rulings	in	R	v	Gomez	[1993]	AC	442	and	R	v	Lawrence	[1972]	AC	626.	87	ibid	253.	88	JC	Smith,	‘Case	comment:	R	v	Hinks’	(2001)	Criminal	Law	Review,	162,	165:	‘The	most	serious	aspect	of	the	present	decision	is	the	conflict	it	creates	between	the	civil	and	the	criminal	law.	It	is	surely	intolerable	that	the	 performance	 of	 a	 perfectly	 valid	 contract	 should	 be	 a	 crime’.	 See	 also,	 R	 Stevens,	 ‘Private	Rights	 and	Public	Wrongs’	in	M	Dyson	Unravelling	Tort	and	Crime	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014)	124–25.	89	R	v	Hinks,	253.	
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where	 dishonesty	 is	 ‘the	 gravamen’	 of	 the	 offence’.90	In	 this	 context,	 Johnstone	can	be	 seen	 as	 a	 landmark	 in	 the	disassociation	of	 the	 elements	 of	 intellectual	property	offences	from	the	theft	paradigm.	
4	Criminalisation	and	the	Making	of	Modern	Trade	Marks	Law	
A	From	Johnstone	to	Historical	Antecedents	In	 the	 last	 section,	 I	 drew	 attention	 to	 less	 considered	 aspects	 of	 Johnstone	regarding	 the	 relation	 between	 civil	 and	 criminal	 law,	 and	 the	 position	 of	intellectual	 property	 crime	more	 generally	within	 criminal	 law	 frameworks.	 In	this	 section,	 I	 turn	 to	 historical	 antecedents	 that	 help	 us	 to	 reflect	 further	 on	these	observations.	In	so	doing,	I	draw	attention	to	the	historical	contingency	of	the	assumption	that	the	criminal	law	is	peripheral	to	trade	mark	law;	as	Andreas	Rahmatian	 observed	 in	 the	 opening	 of	 his	 Modern	 Law	 Review	 article,	 ‘the	criminal	 liability	which	may	 result	 from	 the	 infringement	of	 a	 registered	 trade	mark’	 is	 ‘usually	 only	 briefly	 discussed’;	 the	 criminal	 law	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 ‘quite	different’	 discipline.	91	In	 fact,	 as	 this	 section	 explains,	 the	 first	 UK	 statute	 to	protect	 trade	 marks	 generally,	 without	 limitation	 to	 subject	 matter,	 was	 a	criminal	 law	measure:	 the	Merchandise	Marks	 Act	 1862.	 After	 illustrating	 the	contribution	of	the	criminal	law	of	forgery	to	the	shape	of	the	1862	Act	(see	part	B	below),	I	explain	how	processes	of	criminalisation,	in	presupposing	that	there	was	an	existing	legal	right	to	be	criminalised,	also	played	an	important	role	in	the	creation	of	the	concept	of	a	civil	law	of	trade	marks	(see	part	C	below).	This	Part	also	discusses	a	fundamental	tension	at	the	root	of	the	1862	Act,	that	ultimately	led	 to	 its	 demise:	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 forgery	 paradigm	 (in	 particular,	 its	requirement	of	dishonesty)	and	the	objective	of	facilitating	efficient	prosecutions	(see	part	D	below).	This	observation	lays	the	groundwork	for	the	conclusion	of	the	chapter	(section	V);	bringing	the	analysis	back	to	Johnstone,	I	show	how	the	
                                                
90	The	phrase	used	by	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	R	v	S,	[30],	quoted	at	text	to	n	65.		91	Rahmatian,	‘Trade	Mark	Infringement	as	a	Criminal	Offence’	(n	18),	670,	referring	to	leading	treatises	and	textbooks	on	intellectual	property	law.	
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experience	 from	 a	 very	 different	 time	 and	 context	 helps	 us	 to	 focus	 on	 more	deep-rooted	 tensions	 in	 intellectual	 property	 crime	 today	 and	 its	 ambivalent	relation	to	‘real’	crime.	
B	The	Merchandise	Marks	Act	1862	and	Forgery	By	way	 of	 background,	 as	 Brad	 Sherman	 and	 Lionel	 Bently	 have	 shown,	 trade	mark	law	emerged	as	a	 ‘discrete	and	recognised	area	of	law’	over	the	course	of	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.	As	of	the	middle	part	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	law	was	‘dilatory	and	chaotic’,92	comprising	statutory	protection	for	trade	marks	for	specific	trades	(eg	cutlery	wares	in	Hallamshire,	linen,	the	hops	trade	and	gun	barrels),93	as	well	as	protection	through	civil	actions	for	deceit	and	the	general	criminal	law	(eg	cheat94	or	obtaining	property	by	false	pretences95).	Viewed	 in	 this	 context,	 the	 Merchandise	 Marks	 Act	 1862	 was	 an	 important	development,	 providing	 statutory	 protection	 for	 the	 first	 time	 for	 trade	marks	broadly	defined.	As	section	1	stated:	‘Trade	Mark’	shall	include	any	and	every	such	Name,	Signature,	Word,	letter,	Device,	Emblem,	Figure,	Sign,	Seal,	Stamp,	Diagram,	Label,	Ticket,	or	other	Mark	as	aforesaid	lawfully	used	by	any	Person	to	denote	any	Chattel	or	(in	Scotland)	any	Article	of	Trade,	Manufacture,	or	Merchandise,	to	be	in	an	Article	or	Thing	of	the	Manufacture,	Workmanship,	Production	or	Merchandise	of	such	Person	or	to	be	an	Article	or	Thing	of	any	peculiar	or	particular	Description	made	or	sold	by	such	Person.		 The	purpose	of	the	legislation,	as	Milner	Gibson	MP	(the	President	of	the	Board	of	Trade)	explained	to	the	House	of	Commons,	was	to	address	the	problem	of	‘forged	Trade	Marks’.96	The	Act	criminalised	inter	alia,	with	‘intent	to	defraud,	or	to	enable	another	to	defraud	any	Person’,	the	forging	or	counterfeiting	of	any	
                                                
92	B	Sherman	and	L	Bently,	The	Making	of	Modern	Intellectual	Property	Law:	The	British	Experience,	1760–
1911	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008)	167.		93	A	summary	of	these	legislative	enactments	can	be	found	in	L	Bently,	‘The	Making	of	Modern	Trade	Mark	Law:	 The	 Construction	 of	 the	 Legal	 Concept	 of	 Trade	Mark	 (1860–1880)’	 in	 L	Bently,	 J	 Davis	 and	 Jane	 C	Ginsburg,	Trade	Marks	and	Brands:	An	 Interdisciplinary	Critique	 (Cambridge,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	2011)	5–7.	94	R	v	Closs	(1858)	169	ER	1082,	Dears	&B	460.	95	R	v	Dundas	(1853)	Cox	Crim	Cas	30;	R	v	Suter	&	Coulson	(1867)	10	Cox	Crim	Cas	577.	96	Parl	Deb.	3rd	S	Vol.	164	col	1089	(18	July	1861).	
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trade	mark	 or	 the	 application	 of	 a	 forged	 or	 counterfeited	 trade	mark	 (or	 the	causing	 or	 procuring	 of	 such	 forging	 or	 counterfeiting,	 or	 application)	 to	 any	chattel/article	 not	 being	 the	 ‘Manufacture,	 Workmanship,	 Production	 or	Merchandise’	 of	 any	 person	 whose	 trade	 mark	 shall	 be	 so	 forged	 or	counterfeited.97			 Existing	literature	has	considered	a	number	of	aspects	of	the	nature	of	the	protection	provided	by	the	Merchandise	Marks	Act.	Lionel	Bently	has	described	the	 Act’s	 protection	 for	 trade	 marks	 as	 a	 ‘communication-based	 wrong’—deriving	from	an	intention	to	deceive—rather	than	premised	on	trade	marks	as	property. 98 	Further,	 Brad	 Sherman	 and	 Lionel	 Bently	 have	 noted	 that	 the	perception	that	trade	mark	law	was	‘more	concerned	with	regulating	fraud	than	property’	 resulted	 in	 the	 exclusion	 of	 trade	 marks	 from	 the	 category	 of	‘intellectual	property’	that	was	taking	shape	in	the	mid-nineteenth	century.99	In	this	 section,	 I	 instead	 consider	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 particular	 criminal	 law	paradigm—forgery—for	the	elements	of	the	action	under	the	1862	Act.			 The	 history	 of	 forgery	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 and	 early	 nineteenth	 centuries	has	been	explored	in	detail	elsewhere.	During	the	eighteenth	century,	there	was	a	huge	expansion	in	forgery	legislation;	among	other	things,	this	made	forgery	of	a	 wide	 variety	 of	 documents	 relating	 to	 public	 and	 private	 finance	 a	 capital	felony.100	As	 Phil	 Handler	 has	 shown,	 forgery	 assumed	 ‘critical	 importance’	 in	nineteenth-century	 debates	 that	 led	 to	 penal	 reform	 in	 the	 1830s,	 removing	capital	punishment	 for	over	200	 crimes	 comprising	 the	 ‘Bloody	Code’	 that	had	
                                                
97	Merchandise	Marks	Act	1862,	s	2.	98	L	Bently,	 ‘From	Communication	to	Thing:	Historical	Aspects	to	the	Conceptualisation	of	Trade	Marks	as	Property’	 in	GB	Dinwoodie	and	MD	 Janis	 (eds)	Trademark	Law	and	Theory:	A	Handbook	on	Contemporary	
Research	(Cheltenham,	Edward	Elgar,	2008)	section	II(A).	99	Sherman	and	Bently,	The	Making	of	Modern	Intellectual	Property	Law	(n	92)	172.	100	Lindsay	Farmer	refers	 to	 forgery	as	 the	 ‘quintessential	crime’	of	 the	eighteenth	century.	See	L	Farmer,	
Making	the	Modern	Criminal	Law:	Criminalization	and	Civil	Order	(Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	2016)	69.	See	also	R	McGowen,	 ‘Making	 the	 ‘Bloody	Code’?	Forgery	Legislation	 in	Eighteenth-Century	England’	 in	N	Landau,	Law,	Crime	and	English	Society:	1660–1830	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002)	117–38,	explaining	 the	 increase	 in	 forgery	 legislation	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 by	 the	 need	 to	 secure	 a	 financial	system	that	sustained	a	nation	at	war.	
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been	passed	in	the	eighteenth	century.	101	By	the	mid-nineteenth	century,	forgery	spanned	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 offences:	 while	 the	 offence	 at	 common	 law	 was	 a	misdemeanour,	 there	 was	 also	 a	 complex	 web	 of	 statutory	 offences,	 some	 of	which	were	 felonies.	Many	 of	 these	were	 codified	 by	 the	 Forgery	 Act	 1861.102	Forgery	was	not	defined	by	 statute;	 as	 James	Fitzjames	Stephen	noted,	writing	later	 in	 the	 century,	 the	 Forgery	 Act	 1861	 merely	 enumerated	 the	 types	 of	document	that	could	be	forged.103	The	essential	characteristics	of	these	offences	were	 instead	understood	 to	stem	 from	the	offence’s	definition	at	 common	 law:	‘the	 fraudulent	 making	 or	 alteration	 of	 a	 writing	 to	 the	 prejudice	 of	 another	man’s	 right’;104	as	 a	 leading	 criminal	 law	 treatise—William	 Oldnall	 Russell’s	A	
Treatise	on	Crimes	and	Misdemeanors—stated:	 ‘the	counterfeiting	of	any	writing	with	 a	 fraudulent	 intent,	 whereby	 another	 may	 be	 prejudiced,	 is	 forgery	 at	common	law’.105			 How	did	the	1862	Act	relate	to	these	pre-existing	criminal	 law	offences?	On	one	level,	the	1862	Act	can	be	seen	as	a	legislative	response	to	court	rulings	in	the	late	1850s,	on	the	ambit	of	existing	common	law	offences.	In	R	v	Smith,106	the	 Court	 of	 Crown	 Cases	 Reserved	 quashed	 a	 defendant’s	 conviction	 for	common	 law	 forgery,	 by	 procuring	 the	 printing	 of	 10,000	wrappers	 that	were	similar	 to	 the	wrappers	under	which	the	prosecutor	sold	his	product:	powders	called	 ‘Borwick’s	 Baking	 Powders’	 and	 ‘Borwick’s	 Egg	 Powders’.	 Rejecting	 the	argument	by	Counsel	for	the	plaintiff,	that	the	false	wrapper	was	analogous	to	a	
                                                
101	P	 Handler,	 ‘Forging	 the	 Agenda:	 The	 1819	 Select	 Committee	 on	 Criminal	 Laws	 Revisited’	 (2004)	 25	
Journal	of	Legal	History	3,	249–68,	262.	102	24&25	Vict.	See	generally,	WM	Oldnall	Russell	and	CS	Greaves,	A	Treatise	on	Crimes	and	Misdemeanors,	4th	edn	(London,	Stevens	&	Sons,	1865)	Vol	2,	Ch	33.	As	Stephen	noted,	the	intention	behind	the	1861	Act	was	to	codify	all	existing	forgery	legislation,	but	it	in	fact	left	a	number	pre-existing	enactments	unrepealed:	JF	Stephen,	The	History	of	the	Criminal	Law	of	England	(London,	Macmillan	&	Co,	1883)	Vol	3,	184–85.	103	Stephen,	A	History	of	the	Criminal	Law	(ibid)	Vol	3,	184.	104	Quoted	 in	 the	edition	of	a	 leading	criminal	 law	treatise	current	at	 the	 time	of	 the	debates	on	the	1862	Act:	 WO	 Russell	 and	 CS	 Greaves,	 A	 Treatise	 on	 Crimes	 in	Misdemeanors,	 3rd	 edn	 (London,	 Saunder	 and	Benning,	1843)	318,	quoting	Blackstone’s	Commentaries	Vol	4,	247.	105	Russell	and	Greaves,	A	Treatise	on	Crimes	in	Misdemeanors	(n	104)	358.	106	R	v	John	Smith	(1858)	169	ER	1122;	Dears	&	B	566.	
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‘false	 certificate’,107	the	Court	 held	 that	 the	 ‘real	 offence’	was	 the	 ‘issuing	 them	with	 the	 fraudulent	 matter	 in	 them’;	 merely	 printing	 the	 wrappers	 did	 not	involve	forgery.	As	Pollock	CB	concluded:		I	doubt	very	much	whether	these	papers	are	within	that	principle.	They	are	merely	wrappers,	and	in	their	present	shape	I	doubt	whether	they	are	anything	like	a	document	or	instrument	which	is	the	subject	of	forgery	at	common	law.108			 While	 the	 printing	 of	 wrappers	 bearing	 the	 mark	 of	 another	 was	 not	forgery,	the	Court	in	Smith	made	clear	that	the	defendant	might	have	committed	the	 offence	of	 obtaining	money	by	 false	pretences.109	Further,	 the	 ruling	 in	R	v	
Closs,	 suggested	 that	 such	 conduct	might	 also	 be	 actionable	 as	 a	 common	 law	cheat;	common	law	cheat	encompassed	‘frauds	which	affect	…	the	public	at	large’	and	 this	 included	 the	 use	 of	 ‘false	 tokens’	 with	 ‘the	 semblance	 of	 public	authenticity’.110	In	Closs,	Cockburn	CJ	held	obiter	that:	if	a	person,	in	the	course	of	his	trade	openly	and	publicly	carried	on,	were	to	put	a	false	mark	or	token	upon	an	article,	so	as	to	pass	it	off	as	a	genuine	one	when	in	fact	it	was	only	a	spurious	one,	and	the	article	was	sold	and	money	obtained	by	means	of	that	false	mark	or	token,	that	would	be	a	cheat	at	common	law111	
                                                
107	ibid	572.	Relying	on	cases	about	certificates	in	R	v	Toshack	(1849)	169	ER	341,	1	Den	492.	R	v	Sharman	(1854)	169	ER	729;	Dearsly	285,	counsel	argued	that:	‘The	certificates	in	the	cases	of	Toshack	and	Sharman	certified	that	a	man	had	done	certain	things.	Here	the	wrapper	is	in	effect	a	certificate	that	Borwick	had	put	his	powder	in	the	packet’.	108	R	v	 John	 Smith,	 573–74.	 See	 also	Willes	 J:	 ‘I	 am	 entirely	 of	 the	 same	 opinion	…	 The	 fraud	 consists	 in	putting	inside	the	wrappers	powder	which	is	not	genuine	and	selling	that’	(at	574).	Byles	J:	‘Here	there	was	no	 counterfeit.	 The	 offence	 lies	 in	 the	 use	 of	 the	 wrapper’	 (at	 575).	 Bramwell	 B:	 ‘Forgery	 supposes	 the	possibility	of	a	genuine	document	…	The	prisoner	may	have	committed	a	gross	fraud	in	using	the	wrappers	for	 that	which	was	 not	 the	 genuine	 powder,	 and	may	 possibly	 be	 indicted	 for	 obtaining	money	 by	 false	pretences,	but	I	think	he	cannot	be	convicted	of	forgery’	(at	575).		109	ibid	573,	per	Pollock	CB:	‘The	defendant	may	have	been	guilty	of	obtaining	money	by	false	pretences;	of	that	there	can	be	no	doubt…’	See	also	Willes	J	at	574,	Bramwell	B	and	Channell	B	at	575.	For	examples	of	successful	prosecutions	see:	R	v	Dundas	(1853)	Cox	Crim	Cas	30;	R	v	Suter	&	Coulson	(1867)	10	Cox	Crim	Cas	577.	110	Russell	and	Greaves,	A	Treatise	on	Crimes	in	Misdemeanors	(n	104)	279.	111	R	v	Closs	(1858)	169	ER	1082;	Dearsly	and	Bell	460,	466.	Closs	concerned	the	unauthorised	imitation	of	a	signature	on	a	painting,	but	Cockburn	CJ	(at	467)	also	gave	the	following	example:	‘if	a	man	sold	a	gun	with	the	mark	of	a	particular	manufacturer	upon	 it,	so	as	 to	make	 it	appear	 like	 the	genuine	production	of	 the	manufacturer,	that	would	be	a	false	mark	or	token,	and	the	party	would	be	guilty	of	a	cheat,	and	therefore	liable	 to	 punishment’.	 A	 judgment	 was	 also	 delivered	 by	 Crompton	 J;	 while	 he	 supported	 Cockburn	 CJ’s	opinion	 he	 expressly	 did	 not	 wish	 to	 ‘pledge’	 himself	 ‘as	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 false	 token,	 which	 would	amount	to	a	cheat	at	common	law’	(at	467).		
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	 Notwithstanding	 this	 case	 law,	 both	 cheat	 and	 false	 pretences	 required	the	prosecution	to	prove	causation	between	the	false	pretence	or	false	token	and	the	 fraudulent	 obtaining	 of	 money.	 This	 sometimes	 caused	 problems	 for	prosecutors, 112 	as	 the	 parliamentary	 debates	 on	 the	 Bill	 acknowledged. 113	Forgery,	 then,	 overcame	 these	 problems	 of	 proof	 in	 so	 far	 as	 the	 offence	was	complete	 when	 the	mark	was	 forged,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 it	 was	 applied	 to	goods114	(though,	as	we	see	below,	it	raised	different	problems).115			 The	forgery	paradigm	upon	which	the	1862	Act	was	based,	however,	was	more	than	just	a	legislative	reversal	of	the	approach	at	common	law;	it	was	also	intended	 to	 indicate	 that	 trade	 mark	 offences	 were	 a	 serious	 crime.	 This	 is	apparent	 from	 the	 particular	 analogy	 drawn	 in	 the	 legislative	 debates	 on	 the	1862	 Act:	 trade	 mark	 forgery	 was	 compared	 to	 the	 forgery	 of	 a	 ‘check	 on	 a	bank’116	or	 a	 ‘bill	 of	 exchange’.117	This	 comparison	 was	 a	 statement	 about	 the	serious	 nature	 of	 the	 criminality	 involved;	 the	 forgery	 of	 cheques	 or	 bills	 of	exchange	 was	 a	 felony	 punishable	 by	 penal	 servitude	 for	 life.118	As	 an	 article	from	The	Jurist	explained,	comparing	forgery	of	a	trade	mark	to	forgery	of	a	bill	of	exchange:		
                                                
112	In	R	v	Closs,	this	was	the	reason	for	the	jury’s	‘not	guilty’	verdict	on	the	count	for	false	pretences:	Thomas	Closs,	 2	 November	 1857,	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Central	 Criminal	 Court	 864	 [1109],	 available	 at	www.oldbaileyonline.org.	The	prosecution	for	cheat	failed	because	the	indictment	was	not	correctly	framed:	
R	v	Closs,	467.	113	Parl	Deb	3rd	S	Vol	167	col	1419	(4	July	1862),	the	Attorney	General:	‘Its	object	was	to	avoid	the	necessity	of	having	 to	adduce	before	a	 jury	such	evidence—which	 it	was	sometimes	very	difficult	 to	get—as	would	satisfy	them	that	the	offence	of	cheating	at	common	law	had	been	committed’.	114	On	 this	 point,	 see	DM	Kerly	 and	FG	Underhay,	The	Law	of	Merchandise	Marks	and	the	Criminal	Law	of	
False	Marking,	3rd	edn	(London,	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	1909)	18.	115	See	below,	text	to	nn	145–55.	116	Milner	 Gibson	MP,	 in	 debating	 the	 Bill	 in	 the	 Committee	 of	 the	House	 of	 Commons,	 asserted	 that	 the	‘forgery	of	a	mark	was	like	the	forgery	of	a	check	on	a	bank’.	Parl	Deb	3rd	S	Vol	167	col	1419	(4	July	1862).	117	‘There	is	no	real	distinction	between	using	the	name	of	another	in	a	bill	of	exchange	with	the	intention	to	defraud	and	using	 the	 trade	mark	of	 another	 for	 a	 similar	purpose	…’	The	Jurist,	 18.10.1862,	471.	Arthur	Ryland,	a	solicitor	and	prominent	member	of	the	Birmingham	Chamber	of	Commerce,	in	a	paper	presented	to	the	National	Association	of	the	Promotion	of	Social	Science	asserted	that	the	unauthorised	use	of	‘names’	was	analogous	to	‘the	writing	of	another’s	name	to	a	bill	of	exchange	and	obtaining	money	for	it’.	A	Ryland,	‘The	 Fraudulent	 Imitation	 of	 Trade	 Marks’	 in	 (1859)	 Transactions	 of	 the	 National	 Association	 for	 the	
Promotion	of	Social	Science,	229.	118	JB	 Byles,	A	Treatise	 on	 the	Law	of	Bills	 of	 Exchange,	 Promissory	Notes,	Bank-notes	 and	Checks,	 9th	 edn	(London,	H	Sweet,	1866)	citing	Forgery	Act	1861,	24	&	25	Vict,	s	.22.	See	also	Russell,	A	Treatise	on	Crimes	
and	Misdemeanors	(n	102)	940–41.	
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if	there	is	any	distinction	it	is	merely	one	of	degree—both	offences	come	under	the	same	category—they	are	both	forgeries;	and	if	one	offence	is	to	be	punished	with	less	severity	than	the	other,	it	is	not	because	the	criminality	is	less	in	the	one	case	than	the	other	but	because	the	result	of	the	one	kind	of	forgery	are	more	mischievous	to	society	than	the	other.119			 What	did	the	forgery	paradigm	mean	for	the	shape	of	the	1862	Act?	First,	the	 forgery	 basis	 was	 one	 justification	 for	 the	 rejection	 of	 registration.120	As	Milner	Gibson	MP	explained:	The	forgery	of	a	mark	was	like	the	forgery	of	a	check	on	a	bank.	If	an	intent	to	defraud	him	was	proved,	a	man	was	entitled	to	protection,	without	being	put	to	the	expense	of	registration.121	In	taking	this	stance,	the	Government	measure	was	at	odds	with	the	proposals	of	many	 local	Chambers	of	Commerce:	 a	number	of	 local	Chambers	of	Commerce	had	 proposed	 registration,	 in	 petitions	 presented	 to	 Parliament,122	and	 a	 Bill	including	 registration	 prepared	 by	 the	 Sheffield	 Chamber	 was	 presented	 to	Parliament.123		
                                                
119	The	Jurist,	18	October	1862,	471.	120	This	was	not	the	only	explanation;	another	was	complexity	and	expense.	See,	for	example,	the	comments	of	the	Lord	Chancellor	(Lord	Campbell)	on	the	Bill’s	second	reading	on	the	same	subject	debated	in	1861:	Parl	Deb	3rd	S	Vol	161	col	1271	(4	March	1861).	121	Parl	Deb	3rd	S	Vol	167	col	1419	(4	July	1862).	122	See	the	Wolverhampton	Chamber	of	Commerce’s	petition,	App	816,	Appendix	to	the	Report	of	the	Select	
Committee	on	Public	Petitions	 (in	 respect	 of	 petitions	 presented	 30	 June–2	 July	 1862)	 and	 VC	Beaumont,	
Wolverhampton	Chamber	of	Commerce	1856–1956	(1956),	48.	See	also	the	Sheffield	Corporation’s	petition,	App	 411,	 Appendix	 to	 the	 Report	 of	 the	 Select	 Committee	 on	 Public	 Petitions	 (in	 respect	 of	 petitions	presented	 7–9	 April	 1862).	 See	 also	 the	 ‘Report	 on	 Trade	 Marks’	 contained	 in	 Glasgow	 Chamber	 of	Commerce	 Minutes,	 11	 February	 1862	 (Glasgow	 City	 Archives,	 Glasgow,	 UK).	 See	 also	 the	 National	Association	 for	 the	 Promotion	 of	 Social	 Science’s	 petition,	 App	 83,	 Appendix	 to	 the	 Report	 of	 the	 Select	
Committee	 on	 Public	 Petitions	 (in	 respect	 of	 petitions	 presented	 24–25	 February	 1862).	 See	 also	 the	Birmingham	and	Midland	District	Chamber	of	Commerce’s	petition,	App	360	Appendix	to	the	Report	of	the	
Select	Committee	on	Public	Petitions	(in	respect	of	petitions	presented	21–22	March	1861)	and	Chronicles	of	
the	 Birmingham	 Commercial	 Social	 and	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 A.D.	 1783–1913	 (1913)	 174.	 See	 also	Association	 of	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce	 Standing	Committee	Minutes	 (22	March	1862)	 and	Association	 of	Chambers	 of	 Commerce	 Executive	 Council	 Minutes	 (2	 February	 1860),	 London	 Metropolitan	 Archives,	London.	123	Trade	 Marks	 Bill	 PP	 1862	 Bill	 17.	 A	 petition	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Sheffield	 Bill	 was	 presented	 by	 the	Wolverhampton	Chamber	of	Commerce:	App	816,	Appendix	to	the	Report	of	the	Select	Committee	on	Public	
Petitions	(in	respect	of	petitions	presented	30	June	1862–2	July	1862).	See	also	Wolverhampton	Chamber	of	Commerce	 Minutes	 for	 5	 March	 1861	 (Wolverhampton	 Archives	 &	 Local	 Studies,	 Wolverhampton),	recording	a	discussion	between	Sheffield	and	Wolverhampton	Chambers	on	the	subject	of	registration.	The	Sheffield	Bill	was	also	 supported	by	 the	 then	 recently	 formed	Association	of	Chambers	of	Commerce,	 see	Report	 of	 the	 Chairman	 to	 the	 Association	 of	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce,	 19	 February	 1862	 (London	Metropolitan	 Archives,	 London).	 By	 contrast,	 the	 Huddersfield	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 supported	 the	Government	 Bill,	 that	 became	 the	 Merchandise	 Marks	 Act	 1862:	 see	 the	 Huddersfield	 Chamber	 of	
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	 Secondly,	the	forgery	paradigm	resulted	in	the	criminalisation	of	a	broad	range	of	unauthorised	acts	relating	to	a	trade	mark.	As	I	noted	above,	the	crime	of	 forgery	was	complete	on	the	forging	of	 the	mark;	 there	was	no	necessity	 for	the	mark	to	be	used	in	trade	or	affixed	to	goods.	Forgery	also	criminalised	acts	of	‘uttering’	which,	in	the	case	of	private	financial	instruments,	required	the	parting	with,	tendering,	offering	or	use	in	order	to	receive	credit.124	Hence	the	provisions	of	 the	 1862	 Act	 encompassed	 ‘whosoever	 shall	 forge	 or	 counterfeit,	 or	 shall	
utter…’.125	While	not	discussed	explicitly,	the	comparison	with	forgery	of	private	finance	 instruments	may	have	had	 implications	 for	the	scope	of	protection:	 the	offence	 of	 forgery	 as	 applied	 to	 bills	 or	 cheques	 merely	 required	 the	 forged	instrument	 to	be	 ‘seemingly	genuine’	 such	 that	 ‘it	was	 calculated	 to	 impose	on	mankind	 in	 general’	 and	 would	 ‘deceive	 persons	 using	 ordinary	 observation’;	there	was	 ‘no	 need	 for	 perfect	 resemblance’	 and	 it	was	 not	 necessary	 that	 ‘an	individual	skilled	in	that	kind	of	writing	would	detect	its	fallacy.’126			 Finally,	 the	 forgery	 paradigm	meant	 that	 there	was	 only	 liability	where	the	prosecutor	proved	dishonesty;	 as	 the	 chapter	on	 forgery	 in	 Joseph	Chitty’s	treatise	on	Bills	of	Exchange	 stated:	 ‘intent	 to	defraud’	was	 ‘the	very	essence	of	forgery’.127	Indeed,	 forgery	was	 classified	as	 a	crimen	falsi:	 a	 crime	 that,	due	 to	the	 dishonesty	 involved,	 rendered	 an	 offender	 infamous,	 that	 is,	 deprived	 of	certain	 ‘rights	 of	 a	 citizen’,	 such	 as	 serving	 on	 a	 jury.128	We	 return	 to	 the	requirement	of	‘intent	to	defraud’	later.	
C	Criminalisation	and	the	Civil	Law	of	Trade	Marks	
                                                                                                                                      Commerce’s	petition,	App	211,	Appendix	to	the	Report	of	the	Select	Committee	on	Public	Petitions	(in	respect	of	petitions	presented	17–19	March	1862).	124	Byles,	A	Treatise	on	the	Law	of	Bills	of	Exchange	(n	118)	321.	125	Merchandise	Marks	Act	1862,	s	1,	emphasis	added.	126	Byles,	A	Treatise	on	the	Law	of	Bills	of	Exchange	(n	118)	318–19.	127	J	 Chitty	 and	 JW	 Hume,	 Practical	 Treatise	 on	 Bills	 of	 Exchange,	 Checks	 on	 Bankers,	 Promissory	 Notes,	
Bankers’	Cash	Notes	and	Bank	Notes,	9th	edn	(London),	reprinted	in	the	12th	American	edition	(Springfield,	S&C	Merriam,	1854)	864.	128	Byles,	A	Treatise	on	the	Law	of	Bills	of	Exchange	(n	118)	317.	
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The	 criminal	 law,	 then,	 provided	 the	 paradigm	 for	 the	 nature	 of	 trade	 mark	protection	 under	 the	Merchandise	Marks	Act	 1862,	 the	 first	 statute	 protecting	trade	marks	generally.	However,	there	was	another	contribution	of	criminal	law	frameworks	to	nineteenth	century	trade	mark	 law:	the	1862	Act’s	criminal	 law	basis	 also	 had	 important	 implications	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 a	civil	 law	 of	 trade	 marks.	 Existing	 scholarship,	 as	 we	 have	 already	 seen,	 has	referred	 to	 mid-nineteenth	 century	 trade	 mark	 law	 as	 ‘dilatory	 and	 chaotic’,	‘uncertain’	 and	 not	 ‘coherent’.129	Lionel	 Bently,	 in	The	Making	of	Modern	Trade	
Mark	Law,	cites	the	evidence	of	the	solicitor	Joseph	Travers	Smith	to	the	Select	Committee	 preceding	 the	 1862	 Act’s	 passage	 about	 the	 existing	 law’s	 ‘very	considerable’	problems:		trade	marks	are	not	recognised	as	having	any	legal	validity	or	effect	…	there	is	no	written	law	and	we	have	consequently	no	definition	by	which	we	can	try	what	a	trade	mark	is,	nor	consequently	what	particular	symbol	amounts	to	a	trade	mark.130	Yet,	 as	 we	 will	 now	 see,	 criminalisation	 involved	 presupposing	 order	 and	coherence	 on	 existing	 common	 law	 protection;	 the	 process	 of	 criminalisation	contributed	to	the	creation	of	a	civil	law	of	trade	marks	as	an	identifiable	body	of	law.			 By	way	of	background,	as	Lindsay	Farmer	has	explained,	 the	nineteenth	century	 saw	 ‘a	huge	 expansion	of	 the	 criminal	 law’	by	 the	 ‘legislative	 state’;	 in	addition	 to	 extensive	 legislation	 codifying	 and	 consolidating	 existing	 offences,	numerous	 new	 statutory	 offences	 were	 created,	 concerning	 a	 broad	 range	 of	activities.131	A	 common	 justification	 for	 such	 legislative	 criminalisation,	 shows	Farmer,	was	the	view	that	‘the	function	of	the	criminal	law	was	that	of	defending	
                                                
129	Sherman	and	Bently,	The	Making	of	Modern	Intellectual	Property	Law	(n	92)	166;	L	Bently,	The	Making	of	
Modern	 Trade	 Mark	 Law	 (n	 93)	 4.	 Report	 from	 the	 Select	 Committee	 on	 the	 Trade	 Marks	 Bill	 and	Merchandise	marks	Bill;	PP	1862	(212),	Q.2619.	130	Bently,	ibid.	131	Farmer,	Making	the	Modern	Criminal	Law	(n	100)	78.	
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rights	defined	elsewhere	 in	 the	 law’.132	As	 the	Commissioners	on	Criminal	Law	asserted	in	their	Fourth	Report	published	in	1839:		A	crime	must	usually	consist	of	some	act,	or	combination	of	acts,	constituting	a	violation	of	some	right,	or	an	attempt	to	violate	some	right,	aggravated	by	the	use	of	violence,	or	a	fraudulent	of	malicious	intention.133		In	 the	 debates	 preceding	 the	Merchandise	Marks	 Act’s	 passage,	 the	 ‘right’,	 the	violation	 of	which	was	 being	 criminalised,	was	 expressed	 to	 be	 the	 protection	provided	by	the	Court	of	Chancery,	ancillary	to	the	common	law	of	deceit.	As	the	President	 of	 the	 Board	 of	 Trade,	Milner	 Gibson	MP	 explained	 to	 the	 House	 of	Commons	Select	Committee,	the	Merchandise	Marks	Bill	did	not	involve:		the	creation	of	any	new	species	of	property	in	trade	marks.	The	rights	now	protected	by	the	Court	of	Chancery	are	the	only	rights	which	I	would	protect	under	any	criminal	law134	In	 this	 sense,	 as	Milner	 Gibson	MP	 explained,	 the	Merchandise	Marks	 Bill	was	understood	to	be	different	to	the	legislative	reform	of	design	law135	that	‘created	a	new	kind	of	property,	which	would	not	otherwise	have	existed’;	‘in	the	case	of	trade	 marks	 …	 the	 law	 already	 recognised	 a	 property	 in	 those	 marks	 and	rendered	it	a	civil	offence	to	forge	them’.	136	Criminalisation,	then,	demanded	that	the	 common	 law	 of	 deceit	 be	 conceived	 as	 a	 civil	 law	 of	 trade	marks.	 Indeed,	Milner	Gibson	MP’s	reference	to	the	protection	offered	by	the	Court	of	Chancery	is	not	without	significance.	The	Court	of	Chancery	had	claimed	a	jurisdiction	for	itself	that	went	beyond	the	common	law	basis	of	the	action;	in	Millington	v	Fox	an	injunction	was	 granted	where	 there	was	 no	 evidence	 of	 fraudulent	 use	 by	 the	
                                                
132	ibid	82.	133	Fourth	Report	of	Her	Majesty’s	Commissioners	on	Criminal	Law,	PP	1839	 [168],	xiii.	 See	also,	Seventh	Report	 of	 Her	Majesty’s	 Commissioners	 on	 Criminal	 Law,	 PP	 1943	 [448],	 7	 ‘All	wrongs	 are	 violations	 of	right,	the	subject	of	either	preventative	or	remedial	provisions	…’	134	‘Parliamentary	Committees:	Trade	Marks’,	The	Standard	8.4.1862,	5.	135	This	was	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 Design	 Registration	 Act	 1839	 (2	 Vict),	 which	was	 the	 first	 Act	 to	 protect	designs	to	all	articles	of	manufacture,	and	not	just	fabrics.	See	further,	Sherman	and	Bently,	The	Making	of	
Modern	Intellectual	Property	Law	(n	92)	64.	136	Parl	Deb	3rd	S	Vol	165	col	446	(18	February	1862),	Milner	Gibson	MP	speaking	in	the	context	of	debates	about	registration.	
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defendant137	and	such	an	extension	was	uncertain	as	it	raised	difficult	questions	of	 principle	 about	 the	 relation	 between	 law	 and	 equity.138	These	 uncertainties	went	unmentioned	in	 legislative	debates	 identifying	the	pre-existing	rights	that	were	to	be	criminalised.			 Similar	observations	can	be	made	about	the	nature	of	prosecutions	under	the	1862	Act;	in	applying	the	MMA,	a	number	of	courts	expressly	deferred	to	the	civil	 courts	 of	 common	 law	 and	 equity	 on	 substantive	 trade	 mark	 law	 issues,	treating	 the	 common	 law	 of	 deceit	 as	 the	 substantive	 law	 of	 trade	marks.	 For	instance,	Liverpool	Police	Court	declined	to	rule	on	whether	‘prepared	corn’	for	corn	 starch	was	 a	 ‘mark’	 protected	by	 the	1862	Act,	 the	magistrate	 suggesting	that	the	complainants	should	first	‘get	an	authoritative	decision’	from	the	Court	of	 Chancery.139	In	 another	 prosecution	 under	 the	 1862	 Act,	 about	 markings	applied	 to	 hops,	Mansion	 House	 Police	 Court	 granted	 the	 defendant	 ‘a	 special	case	for	the	purpose	of	taking	the	opinion	of	the	Court	of	Queen’s	Bench	on	the	law	 as	 applicable	 to	 the	 facts’, 140 	though	 this	 ‘appeal’	 was	 subsequently	withdrawn.141 	Implicit	 in	 these	 rulings,	 then,	 was	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	substantive	 law	 of	 trade	 marks	 was	 a	 domain	 defined	 by	 civil	 law;	criminalisation,	therefore,	contributed	to	the	creation	of	the	concept	of	a	civil	law	of	trade	marks.	
D	Efficient	Enforcement	v	the	Forgery	Paradigm			 In	 relating	 the	 1862	 Act	 to	 pre-existing	 civil	 protection,	 the	 legislative	debates	also	presented	criminalisation	as	being	concerned	with	the	provision	of	a	‘more	prompt	and	less	expensive	remedy’	for	existing	common	law	rights;	the	objective	 of	 criminalisation	was	 ‘to	 facilitate	 the	 process’	 of	 the	more	 efficient	
                                                
137	Millington	v	Fox	(1838)	3	Myl	&	Cr	388;	40	ER	956.	138	Bently,	‘From	Communication	to	Thing’	(n	98)	text	to	fn	43–45.	139	Liverpool	Police	Court	(1964)	Liverpool	Mercury	(7	July)	3.	140	Mansion	House	(1865)	The	Standard	(17	July)	7.	141	Mansion	House	(1865)	The	Standard	(28	November)	3.	
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enforcement	of	existing	rights	at	common	law,142	overcoming	the	‘inefficiency	of	the	present	law,	and	of	its	great	costliness	and	the	delay	which	it	occasioned’.143	As	we	will	now	see,	this	goal	came	into	conflict	with	the	forgery	paradigm	upon	which	the	Act	was	based,	and	was	ultimately	the	cause	of	the	1862	Act’s	demise.			 As	 we	 saw	 above,	 the	 mental	 element	 of	 dishonesty—or	 intention	 to	defraud—was	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 of	 forgery.144	However,	 in	 the	debates	culminating	in	the	1862	Act,	concerns	that	this	would	stand	in	the	way	of	 efficient	 prosecutions,	 resulted	 in	 proposals	 to	 place	 the	 burden	 of	 proving	dishonesty	 on	 the	 defendant.145	In	 the	 debate	 on	 these	 proposals,	 in	 1861,	objections	were	raised	as	regards	the	position	of	‘innocent	parties	who	purchase	goods	 in	the	ordinary	course	of	business,	and	sell	 them	without	any	fraudulent	intent’; 146 	in	 particular,	 ‘wholesale	 traders	 who	 deal	 in	 goods	 which	 are	manufactured	 by	 others’.	147	As	 the	 petition	 of	 one	 society	 representing	 these	interests—the	Manchester	Guardian	Society	for	the	Protection	of	Trade—stated:	your	petitioners	represent	those	who	deal	in	goods	which	are	so	variously	marked	that	it	is	utterly	impossible	to	ascertain	in	most	cases	whether	any	trade	mark	or	alleged	trade	mark	is	interfered	with,	or	even	whether	the	mark	is	intended	as	a	trade	mark	or	not;	and	yet	at	the	instance	of	interested	or	malicious	persons,	criminal	proceedings	might	be	taken	…	with	the	proof	of	infringement	thrown	onto	the	accused148	
                                                
142	‘Parliamentary	Committees:	Trade	Marks’	(1862)	The	Standard	(8	April)	5,	Milner	Gibson	MP.	143	ibid,	Mr	Smith	of	the	firm	Avery	and	Co	London.	144	See	text	to	n	127	above.	145	Merchandise	Marks	Bill	PP	1861	Bill	79,	cl	8.	Cf	the	debate	about	the	burden	of	proof	under	s	92(5)	today	(see	n	69).	146	Petition	of	three	London	wholesale	warehousemen,	reprinted	at	App	582,	Appendix	to	the	Report	of	the	
Select	Committee	on	Public	Petitions	(in	respect	of	petitions	presented	22–24	April	1861).	147	Petition	of	the	Manchester	Guardian	Society	for	the	Protection	of	Trade,	App	627,	Appendix	to	the	Report	
of	the	Select	Committee	on	Public	Petitions	(in	respect	of	petitions	presented	29	April–1	May	1861).	148	ibid.	 The	 petition	 of	 three	 London	 wholesale	 warehousemen	 (cited	 at	 n	 146	 above)	 also	 supported	registration	as	a	means	of	providing	notice	to	those	dealing	in	goods.	The	Glasgow	Chamber	of	Commerce	was	also	sensitive	 to	 these	 interests,	and	proposed	both	registration	and	 limiting	protected	marks	 just	 to	‘names’	so	as	to	make	it	clear	what	could	be	claimed	as	a	trade	mark.	See	Report	on	Trade	Marks	at	Glasgow	Chamber	of	Commerce,	Minutes	11	February	1862,	Glasgow	City	Archives.	
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	 The	 1862	 Bill	 was	 prepared	 expressly	with	 the	 intention	 of	meeting	 to	this	concern149	and	therefore	the	resulting	1862	Act	required	the	prosecutor	to	prove	 dishonesty.	 However,	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 forgery	 paradigm	(requiring	proof	of	dishonesty)	and	the	objective	of	efficient	remedies	continued	after	 the	 1862	 Act’s	 passage.	 Writing	 three	 years	 after	 the	 Act’s	 passage,	 the	barrister	Edward	Lloyd	commented	that	‘it	does	not	seem	probable	that	this	Act	will	 come	 into	very	general	use,	owing	 to	 the	difficulty	of	proving	a	 fraudulent	intention	…’	150	For	 the	 same	 reason,	writing	 after	 the	Act’s	 repeal,	 the	 treatise	writer	 DM	 Kerly	 described	 the	 1862	 Act	 as	 ‘a	 dead	 letter	 from	 its	 first	enactment’;	 ‘	 it	 left	 the	 onus	 of	 proving	 the	 intent	 to	 defraud	 of	 the	 person	charged	 upon	 the	 prosecutor,	 and	 it	 made	 no	 provision	 for	 the	 summary	prosecution	of	these	offences’.151			 The	 1862	 Act’s	 demise,	 then,	 stemmed	 from	 an	 inherent	 tension	 in	legislative	objectives.	On	the	one	hand,	the	forgery	paradigm	was	important;	the	analogy	with	the	forgery	of	cheques	and	bills	signified	that	trade	mark	offences	were	serious	crimes	involving	dishonesty.152	Yet,	the	requirement	of	dishonesty	at	the	heart	of	forgery153	conflicted	with	the	objective	of	facilitating	the	efficient	prosecution	 of	 the	misuse	 of	 trade	marks.	While	 the	 context	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century	was	very	different,	these	themes	reveal	remarkable	continuity	with	the	underlying	 tensions	 we	 noted	 in	 the	 categorisation	 of	 intellectual	 property	offences	 today.154	Bringing	 the	 analysis	 back	 to	 the	 ruling	 in	 Johnstone,	 the	
                                                
149	As	William	Matheson	Hindmarch	QC,	a	barrister	who	drafted	the	Merchandise	Marks	Bill,	wrote	to	the	Glasgow	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 in	 1862,	 the	 intention	was	 ‘to	 prepare	 a	 Bill	 …	 free	 from	 the	 objections	taken	by	the	wholesale	dealers	to	the	Bill	of	last	year’.	Letter	dated	9	December	1861	from	WM	Hindmarch	to	Samuel	Higginbotham	Esq,	Glasgow	Chamber	of	Commerce	papers,	Glasgow	City	Archives.	150	‘Reviews:	The	Law	of	Trade	Marks’,	(1865)	Solicitors’	Journal	and	Reporter	(18	November)	47,	quoting	E	Lloyd,	The	Law	of	Trade	Marks,	2nd	edn	(London,	Yates	and	Alexander,	1865)	12.	151	Kerly	and	Underhay	 (n	114)	3.	Cf	 the	position	under	 the	Merchandise	Marks	Act	1887	(50	&	51	Vict),	which	 repealed	 and	 replaced	 the	 1862	 Act,	 and	 placed	 the	 burden	 of	 proving	 ‘intent	 to	 defraud’	 on	 the	accused	(see	Kerly	and	Underhay,	Law	of	Merchandise	Marks,	5).	The	aim	of	this	change,	as	well	as	others	introduced	by	 the	1887	Act,	was	 to	 ensure	 that	 ‘the	operation	of	 the	measure	 shall	 be	 as	prompt	 and	 as	summary	as	possible.’	Parl	Deb	3rd	S	Vol	316	col	1730	(4	July	1887),	Mr	Mundella.	152	See	text	to	nn	117–19.	153	See	text	to	n	127.	154	See	section	III	A.	
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characterisation	 of	 intellectual	 property	 offences	 today,	 as	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century,	 again	occupies	 a	 complex	 ground,	 straddling	both	analogies	with	 ‘real	crime’	 involving	 dishonesty	 and	 regulatory	 objectives	 of	 facilitating	 efficient	prosecution.	
5	Conclusion	
Johnstone,	 as	we	saw	at	 the	outset,	 is	 the	only	House	of	Lords	authority	on	 the	interpretation	 of	 criminal	 offences	 in	 a	 current	 intellectual	 property	 statute.	While	the	case	has	been	much	considered	for	its	contribution	to	case	law	on	the	functions	of	a	trade	mark	and	the	human	rights	issues	arising	from	the	reversal	of	the	burden	of	proof,	 little	attention	has	been	given	to	its	 implications	for	the	relation	of	intellectual	property	between	civil	and	criminal	law.	This	chapter	fills	this	gap.	 It	has	argued	that	the	position	of	 intellectual	property	offences	within	broader	 criminal	 law	 categories	helps	 to	 explain	why	 the	House	of	 Lords	both	affirmed	 the	 general	 principle	 of	 trying	 to	 keep	 criminal	 offences	 as	 self-contained	as	possible,	while	also	referring	to	concepts	from	the	civil	law	of	trade	marks.	While	‘dishonesty’	is	often	referred	to	as	a	characteristic	of	conduct	that	is	criminalised,	the	elements	of	the	offence	in	section	92	have	been	framed	on	the	basis	 of	 a	 regulatory	 rationale,	 justified	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 public	 interest	 in	efficient	 enforcement.	 This	 latter	 rationale	 explains,	 among	 other	 things,	 why	closer	analogies	between	intellectual	property	crime	and	the	current	law	of	theft	were	not	pursued	in	Johnstone.			 The	 historical	 experience	 uncovered	 in	 this	 chapter	 illustrates	 that	 the	role	of	the	criminal	law	in	intellectual	property	is	far	from	new.	As	we	have	seen,	the	 criminal	 law	provided	an	 important	 contribution	 to	 the	making	of	 the	 first	legislation	protecting	trade	marks	regardless	of	subject	matter:	the	Merchandise	Marks	Act	1862.	Not	only	was	the	basis	of	this	legislation	an	existing	criminal	law	paradigm	 (forgery),	 but	 processes	 of	 criminalisation,	 in	 demanding	 the	identification	 of	 a	 pre-existing	 legal	 right,	 contributed	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	concept	 of	 a	 civil	 law	 of	 trade	 marks.	 The	 assumption	 of	 recent	 times	 that	criminal	 offences	 lie	 at	 the	 periphery	 of	 trade	 mark	 law,	 is	 revealed	 to	 be	
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historically	 contingent;	 criminalisation	 was	 in	 fact	 a	 central	 process	 in	 the	making	of	modern	trade	mark	law.		 How	 do	 these	 historical	 antecedents	 help	 us	 better	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	relation	between	criminal	and	civil	law	in	Johnstone?	Johnstone,	as	we	have	seen,	is	 on	 one	 level	 explained	 by	 factors	 that	 are	 intrinsically	 tied	 to	 its	 context	 in	recent	 times,	most	 obviously	 the	 objective	 of	 EU	 harmonisation	 of	 trade	mark	law	(which	required	the	courts	to	interpret	section	92	so	as	to	keep	the	scope	of	criminal	 offences	 narrower	 than	 the	 protection	 offered	 by	 civil	 law)	 and	 the	particular	 language	of	 the	 relevant	parts	of	 the	Trade	Marks	Act	1994	 (section	92).	 However,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 taken	 on	 their	 own,	 these	 factors	 do	 not	adequately	explain	the	precise	nature	of	the	relation	between	civil	and	criminal	law	struck	by	 the	House	of	Lords.	 Indeed,	 this	was	a	point	 that	was	 raised	but	unanswered	in	the	existing	literature;	why	had	the	House	of	Lords	not	advocated	a	closer	relation	between	civil	and	criminal	 law	concepts?	History,	 in	providing	us	 with	 the	 experience	 of	 a	 very	 different	 time	 and	 context,	 can	 help	 us	 to	transcend	 immediately	 obvious	 explanations,	 and	 uncover	 underlying	 tensions	with	 deeper	 roots.	 While	 there	 are	 stark	 differences	 between	 the	 nineteenth-century	 experience	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter	 and	 the	 case	 law	 on	 intellectual	property	offences	today,	both	reveal	trade	mark	offences	to	be	caught	between	the	 paradigm	 of	 serious	 crime	 involving	 dishonesty	 (forgery	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century	and	theft	today)	and	efficient	enforcement.	As	we	have	seen,	Johnstone	is	best	 understood	 by	 reference	 to	 this	 tension.	 History,	 therefore,	 helps	 us	 to	appreciate	 the	 longstanding	 complexity	 of	 criminal	 offences	 relating	 to	 the	category	 we	 today	 refer	 to	 as	 intellectual	 property,	 and	 their	 ambivalence	 to	paradigms	of	serious	crime.	
